Effective Strategies Small Business Leaders Use to Address Ransomware by Tuttle, William Jason
Walden University 
ScholarWorks 
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection 
2020 
Effective Strategies Small Business Leaders Use to Address 
Ransomware 
William Jason Tuttle 
Walden University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Library and Information Science Commons 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies 
Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an 
















This is to certify that the doctoral study by 
 
 
William Jason Tuttle 
 
 
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,  
and that any and all revisions required by  





Dr. Franz Gottleib, Committee Chairperson, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty 
 
Dr. Janie Mayo, Committee Member, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty 
 






Chief Academic Officer and Provost 










Effective Strategies Small Business Leaders Use to Address Ransomware 
by 
William Jason Tuttle 
 
MS, Keller Graduate School, 2015 
BS, DeVry, 2011 
 
 
Doctoral Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 









Small business leaders face a wide range of cybersecurity threats. Ransomware is a 
specific cybersecurity threat that cybercriminals can use to deny small business leaders’ 
access to data in exchange for a ransom payment. Grounded in routine activity conceptual 
framework, the purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore effective 
strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. Data were collected from 5 
leaders of small businesses in the southeast region of the United States. Data sources 
included interviews and archival documents. Data were analyzed using Yin’s 5 step 
process. The analysis revealed 3 primary themes: ransomware strategy, support structure, 
and cybersecurity awareness. Managers and leaders of small businesses could potentially 
benefit from this research by applying strategies that emerged from the identified themes 
to prevent victimization from ransomware. The implications for positive social change 
include the potential to support the local economy and to prevent and mitigate the spread 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Small business leaders who rely on information systems as a critical component 
of their business face a spectrum of cybersecurity threats. The cybersecurity threat of 
ransomware denies small businesses access to their data in exchange for a ransom 
payment. The threat of ransomware attacks continues to escalate through computer 
vulnerabilities while criminal business models become more sophisticated (Young & 
Yung, 2017). The foundation of this study is the challenges faced by leaders of small 
businesses in protecting their information systems from the escalating use of ransomware. 
Background of the Problem 
The background of the problem consists of a specific type of cybersecurity threat 
to business. Ransomware is a type of cybersecurity threat that, once activated, prevents 
legitimate users from accessing their information systems until they pay a ransom 
(Brown, 2016). The criminal actors involved demand a ransom in return for access to 
business data (Choudhary, Zavarsky, & Lindskog, 2016). Victims typically pay ransoms 
with a difficult-to-trace electronic cryptocurrency (Brown, 2016). Complaints regarding 
infections from ransomware continue to rise (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016; 
Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016). The success rate of infection is evidence that 
security models to protect against ransomware are inadequate. Reactive security models 
fail to provide adequate protection from the threat of cryptoviral ransomware extortion 
attacks (Young & Yung, 2017). Inadequate planning, preparation, and training for 
addressing ransomware can cause a small business to encounter operational disruptions, 
affecting business continuity and causing reputational damage. Small businesses may 
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benefit from knowledge and strategies to protect their information systems from 
ransomware. I have provided the background to the problem, and the focus of the study. 
In the following paragraphs, I discuss the problem statement, purpose statement, nature 
of the study, research questions, interview questions, conceptual framework, operational 
definitions, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, and the significance of the study. 
Finally, I provide a review of the professional and academic literature. 
Problem Statement 
Ransomware has become a significant cybersecurity threat to business 
(Choudhary et al., 2016). Globally, new cases of ransomware infection grew to a rate of 
over 100,000 daily during the first few months of 2016 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2016), with over $2.4 million in losses and 2,673 total complaints for 2016 in the United 
States (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016). The general business problem is that 
many small business cybersecurity resources fail to protect information systems. The 
specific business problem is that some small business leaders lack the cybersecurity 
strategies necessary to protect their information systems from ransomware. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the 
cybersecurity strategies some small business leaders use to protect their information 
systems from ransomware. The targeted population for this study was five small business 
leaders located in the Knox County region of Tennessee who successfully implemented 
cybersecurity strategies to protect their information systems from ransomware. The 
study’s implications for positive social change include the potential for increasing 
3 
 
employment opportunities in the region and supporting the local economy by protecting 
information systems from ransomware. Furthermore, small business leaders may realize 
their value as a cybercrime target and consider implementing stronger cybersecurity 
controls to prevent and mitigate the spread of ransomware to protect confidential and 
sensitive consumer information. 
Nature of the Study 
I used a qualitative method to explore strategies that small business leaders use to 
protect their information systems from ransomware. Researchers espouse using the 
qualitative method to observe, understand, and explore a phenomenon (Goldberg & 
Allen, 2015). Researchers in quantitative research attempt to answer a question by using 
numbers for quantifying, measuring, and comparing the data (McCusker & Gunaydin, 
2015). Mixed method research is relevant when the goal of the researcher is to combine 
the use of quantitative and qualitative methods (Abro, Khurshid, & Aamir, 2015). The 
quantitative and mixed method approaches are not appropriate because my objective was 
to explore the business problem qualitatively and not to conduct a quantitative analysis. 
I used a case study design to explore viewpoints about the cybersecurity strategies 
of small business leaders. Case study design is appropriate in business settings where 
there is a potential benefit from gathering viewpoints from different perspectives and 
analyzing participants’ experience with phenomena (Turner & Danks, 2014). A purpose 
of phenomenological design is to explore the meanings of participants’ lived experiences 
(Wilson, 2015). The phenomenological research design was not appropriate for this study 
because exploring the meanings of lived experiences does not allow for a focused 
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examination of the business problem. In ethnographic research, the researcher must 
explore the culture of participants to become part of the social environment (Gelling, 
2014). An ethnographic research design was not appropriate, as becoming immersed in 
the culture was outside the scope of this study. In narrative research, the objective is to 
understand lived experiences using others’ words or descriptions (Joyce, 2015). Narrative 
research may offer a much wider description of events and behaviors than needed. 
Because I intended to explore strategies for mitigating ransomware from multiple data 
sources, I used a multiple case study design rather than other qualitative designs. 
Research Question  
What cybersecurity strategies do some small business leaders use to protect their 
information systems from ransomware? 
Interview Questions 
1. What strategies do you use to protect your information systems from 
ransomware? 
2. How did you assess the effectiveness of your strategies for protecting your 
information systems from ransomware? 
3. What were the key barriers to implementing the strategies for protecting your 
company from ransomware? 
4. How did you address the key barriers to implementing the strategies for 
improving your protection against ransomware? 
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5. What other information could you add that might be applicable to the strategies 
that small business owners use to protect their information systems from 
ransomware? 
Conceptual Framework 
Cohen and Felson (1979) developed the routine activity theory to explain crime as 
an event that occurs in space and time. Routine activity theory was applicable to my 
study, as small business leaders may use routine activity theory as a framework to 
understand how effective protection against ransomware can prevent infection. Routine 
activity theory is a well-established criminological theory that serves as the basis for 
examining cybercrime offenses and victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). I used routine 
activity theory as the foundation of my conceptual framework because it related to 
developing prevention strategies to address victims and attackers in the cybersecurity 
realm against ransomware. The following key constructs underlie routine activity theory: 
(a) potential offender, (b) target, and (c) absence of protection (Cohen & Felson, 1979). 
Applying the conceptual framework led to an understanding of the findings from this 
study because ransomware requires an actor as the ransomware offender, a target for the 
ransomware payload, and a lack of protection against the payload for the ransomware to 
cause damage. Adequate protection prevents a bad actor from compromising a robust 
system. The absence of adequate protection enables perpetrators to compromise a 
previously clean information system with a ransomware payload. The conceptual 





The following includes definitions of terms used throughout this study. 
Bitcoin: Bitcoin, created in 2009, is a pseudo-anonymous cryptographic electronic 
currency (Ortolani, 2016). 
Blockchain: The blockchain is a public ledger containing the pseudo-anonymous 
Bitcoin addresses with every associated Bitcoin transaction (Ortolani, 2016). 
Capable guardianship: Capable guardianship consists of technical capable 
guardianship (an example is antivirus software) and personal capable guardianship (a 
person with high technical knowledge and capable of anticipating threats thereby 
reducing target accessibility; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). 
Cryptovirology: Researchers from Columbia University coined the term 
cryptovirology to describe the study of offensive cryptoviral technology consisting of 
malware and cryptography (Young & Yung, 2017). 
Guardianship: Guardianship is synonymous with protection, while researchers 
commonly expand the definition to include other elements such as surveillance and the 
role of surveillance in preventing crime (Vries & Gelder, 2015). 
Ransomware: Ransomware is a form of cryptovirology used to extort money from 
victims (Young & Yung, 2017). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are commonly accepted as fact without any proof and made by 
researchers during study design, data capture, and interpretation of results (Niven & 
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Boorman, 2016). The first assumption for this study was that participants would have an 
interest and be willing to participate in the study. Another assumption was that 
participants would provide honest and truthful responses to interview questions. An 
additional assumption was that conducting face-to-face interviews and acquiring 
company documents would provide the information needed for thematic development. 
Another assumption was that responses provided by the participants would be substantial 
and address the research question. To mitigate these assumptions, I purposely selected 
participants, established positive relationships, and conducted interviews that lead to data 
saturation. 
Limitations 
Researchers define limitations of a study to account for known weaknesses and to 
provide transparency (Levy, Fabian, & Peters, 2015). One limitation was the continual 
evolution of ransomware and how effective strategies change over time. The 
effectiveness of ransomware improves as attackers create more sophisticated ransomware 
and exploit new vulnerabilities (Genç, Lenzini, & Ryan, 2017; Kharraz, Robertson, 
Balzarotti, Bilge, & Kirda, 2015). Another limitation was related to my constrained 
sample size, as small samples may not provide significant findings to transfer to other 
venues or businesses with strategies for coping with ransomware. Data saturation within 
qualitative research requires at least two case studies to justify the sample size for 
transferability with small samples (Boddy, 2016). An additional limitation was that the 
chosen participants consisted of small business leaders who may have lacked a priori 
knowledge required to answer the interview questions from the standpoint of an 
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information technology expert. It is possible for researchers to mitigate inherent 
limitations in case study research by combining research synthesis techniques (Levy et 
al., 2015). 
Delimitations 
Study delimitations consist of parameters, scope, and boundaries (Hernández-
Flores et al., 2017). One delimitation of this study was chosen participants were small 
business leaders rather than information technology experts. Another delimitation of the 
study was the sample size of five small business leaders. An additional delimitation of the 
study was the geographic region of the study—the Knox County region of Tennessee. 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is that small business leaders may become more 
informed about the implications of weak cybersecurity controls for compromising 
business operations. Small business leaders remain uninformed of the magnitude of the 
threat posed by ransomware (Fanning, 2015; Paulsen, 2016). Small business leaders may 
learn how to mitigate and strengthen their cybersecurity to lessen negative consequences 
stemming from ransomware attacks. Small business leaders might also gain the 
information they need to promote safety and stability in their locus of control, 
profitability, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness in responsibly managing cybersecurity 
risks associated with ransomware. Businesses leaders of larger firms with more 
sophisticated information systems than a small business might find it useful to adapt the 
strategies used by some small business leaders as mitigation strategies to combat 
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ransomware targeting small business information systems to subcomponents of larger and 
more complex information systems. 
Contribution to Business Practice 
The potential significance of this study to the practice of business is multifaceted. 
Small business leaders may have the opportunity to learn about securing their information 
systems from ransomware attacks. A strategic ransomware cybersecurity plan includes 
scenarios for the potential attack, steps taken during the attack, the post ransomware 
incident response, and defensive posturing (Bridget, 2016). Findings from this study may 
contribute to avoiding or mitigating the effects of ransomware and hardening existing 
information systems, as well as provide a foundation to create a strategic cybersecurity 
plan that may enable small business owners to address the threats from ransomware. 
Implications for Social Change 
The implications of this study to social change include increased public awareness 
about the transformative power of cybersecurity technologies and strengthened trust in 
universal cybernetworks. The potential adoption of a stronger security posture may 
support the protection of sensitive consumer information, while assurance promotes 
consumer trust in Internet commerce. Advancements in cybersecurity support the 
distribution of innovative technologies, which is a societal benefit (Yeoh, 2017). Also, 
positive social change might result from employment opportunities and effects on local 




A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the 
cybersecurity strategies that small business leaders use to protect their information 
systems from ransomware. The purpose of this professional and academic literature 
review was to compare and contrast opposing positions and complementary research 
surrounding my research topic. The literature review begins with an expository of the 
applied conceptual framework of routine activity theory. 
My sources for the literature review included journals available from academic 
databases, such as the Academic Search Complete/Premier, DeepDyve, EBSCOhost, 
Google Scholar, NASA’s Astrophysics Data System Bibliographic Services, ProQuest, 
and SAGE. I accessed these electronic databases through the Walden University Library. 
I kept a research journal to document specific keywords for searching these databases and 
subscribed to peer-reviewed journals to track the latest research and trends related to my 
topic. Specific keywords include 1979 routine activity theory, Cohen and Felson, 
ransomware and business, routine activities, routine activity theory, routine activity 
theory and cybercrime, and a combination of routine activity theory and cybercrime and 
ransomware. In order to assist thematic development, I created an application to track 
references, store annotated bibliographies, and generate thematic mind maps based on 
keyword density. 
The review includes 69 resources, 94% of which were peer-reviewed and verified 
using Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory. Ninety-seven percent had publication dates from 
2014 to 2018. I organized the literature review with the routine activity theory framework 
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first, followed by routine activity theory conceptual constructs, the study of ransomware, 
ransomware and routine activity theory constructs, theory comparisons, cybersecurity, 
strategic management and ransomware cybersecurity, ransomware and business, 
operationalizing routine activity theory constructs, and a summary. 
Routine Activity Theory 
Routine activity theory existed prior to the notion of cybercrime. Cohen and 
Felson (1979) developed routine activity theory to analyze crime without relying on 
offender information. Researchers use this theory to highlight the role of criminal spatial 
decision making on offender familiarity and ease of access, which in turn serves to 
increase preferential selection based on proximity and the likelihood of getting caught 
(Frith, Johnson, & Fry, 2017). The anti-spatial nature of cyberspace is in direct conflict 
with routine activity theory studies because routine activity theory relies on spatial 
properties of the physical environment (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). The suitability of routine 
activity theory for examining cybercrime in the antispatial cyberrealm is not immediately 
evident. 
A precedent does exist, however, for using routine activity theory in cyberspace 
with a major strength of overcoming the challenges inherent in gaining access to 
offenders in the online environment by removing the requirement of the physical 
environment. Regardless of the lack of identified spatial features in cyberspace, routine 
activity theory is suitable for the study of online victimization and high-technology 
malware-related crimes (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Routine activity theory is flexible 
enough to accommodate abstract concepts regarding space and time from the physical 
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world to the virtual. For example, researchers utilize routine activity theory to study 
victimization in the antispatial realm of cybercrime. Paek and Nalla (2015) used routine 
activity theory to find a positive relationship with routine online activities and online 
victimization, and Brady, Randa, and Reyns (2016) used routine activity theory to 
explore financial cybercrime and found that a significant number of businesses 
experience cybercrime on a regular basis. Ilievski (2016) conducted a study using routine 
activity theory to determine that users who spend more time online put themselves at 
greater risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime. Chen, Beaudoin, and Hong (2017) used 
routine activity theory to study victimization in the cyberrealm and found careless 
cybersecurity behavior persists until after victimization occurs.  
Researchers also use routine activity theory to overcome challenges inherent with 
studying cybercrime. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) tested the use of routine activity theory 
and cybercrime to determine awareness and training are the most crucial elements for 
safely banking online, but no determination of the effectiveness of guardianship occurred. 
Choi and Lee (2017) concluded that routine activity theory is inadequate for explaining 
the role of guardianship in cyberinterpersonal violence victimization, and the most 
effective way to mitigate online threats is to use personal digital guardianship and end-
user education on the dangers associated with the Internet. However, Holt, Burruss, and 
Bossler (2016) found that, despite criticism of the effectiveness of routine activity theory 
in cybercrime research, the framework is sufficient for exploring cybercrime 
victimization and for providing target-hardening strategies to combat criminal actors who 
introduce thousands of new malware variants on a daily basis. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) 
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overcame challenges associated with routine activity theory and testing online 
victimization and high-technology malware-related crimes by using interviews.  
Routine activity theory is well suited for the study of victimization and 
guardianship from malware. However, the study of cybersecurity using routine activity 
theory extends beyond topics related to malware. Routine activity theory was suitable for 
developing an understanding of the characteristics of cybervictim targets in phishing 
scams designed to steal money from victims’ bank accounts (Leukfeldt, 2014). One 
example of a phishing scam involves an attacker sending a fraudulent e-mail to a 
potential victim to lure the victim to click on a link or to divulge personal information to 
the attacker (Leukfeldt, 2014). The constructs of routine activity theory encompass a 
potential victim, a motivated attacker, and a lack of capable guardianship (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979). In the phishing scam example, the potential victim is the user who might 
click on the fraudulent link in the e-mail, the motivated attacker is the responsible party 
sending the offending e-mail, and the lack of capable guardianship could be the lack of 
protective software or the lack of user knowledge to differentiate between a legitimate 
link in an e-mail and a fraudulent link in an email. The three constructs of routine activity 
theory fulfill the prerequisites of crime. 
Researchers may not know or have defined the lack of a capable guardian in the 
context of cybercrime. The capable guardian or protective factor component of routine 
activity theory, varies based on the type of cybercrime. The protective factor of antivirus 
software is applicable when the focus is on malware attacks; however, antivirus software 
fails to provide adequate protection against phishing scams (Leukfeldt, 2014). In cases of 
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phishing victimization, the capable guardianship or protective element of routine activity 
theory shifts responsibility to the leadership of financial institutions who coordinate 
financial transactions on behalf of the consumer (Leukfeldt, 2014). The definition of 
capable guardianship is flexible enough to define protection elements present in a small 
business information system. 
Small business information systems contain elements exposed to the public 
Internet. Routine activity theory applied to research involving phishing, hacking, and 
malware allows researchers to consider the increased potential for victimization based on 
online activity and target suitability (Reyns, 2015). Offending and victimization related to 
malware can begin with successful phishing or hacking attacks (Reyns, 2015). 
Researchers have called for additional research related to identifying correlates for online 
victimization (Reyns, 2015). Prior research serves as an empirical foundation of the 
suitability and usefulness of routine activity theory for studying cybercrime (Brady et al., 
2016; Chen et al., 2017; Choi & Lee, 2017; Holt et al., 2016; Ilievski, 2016; Jansen & 
Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Paek & Nalla, 2015). Over time, the use of 
routine activity theory evolved to incorporate and explain routine activity phenomena 
existing in the online realm rather than as originally intended in the physical realm. 
Spatial. Routine activity theory in the spatial context adheres to the original 
intention of explaining how and why crimes occur in the physical realm. It is possible for 
potential victims to design the physical environment to deter potential offenders from 
criminal behavior (Blasdell, 2015). According to researchers, removing a single element 
of routine activity theory is enough to prevent a crime from occurring (Blasdell, 2015; 
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Mui & Mailley, 2015). In the absence of capable guardianship or the lack of oversight 
from management in the physical workplace, perpetration of the crime occurs once a 
suitable target and a motivated offender make contact (Mui & Mailley, 2015). 
Researchers use routine activity theory to predict physical and property victimization in 
the workplace (Kodellas, Fisher, & Wilcox, 2015). The goal of preventing a crime from 
occurring through the lens of routine activity theory includes the reliance on removing 
one of the key tenets of the theory. 
In the spatial realm, it is possible to define the influencing constructs of routine 
activity theory in preventing criminal behavior. Lack of surveillance or guardianship, the 
presence of motivated offenders, and the availability of suitable targets dictate the 
probability and occurrence of crime (Vries & Gelder, 2015). In routine activity theory the 
overlap between a motivated offender, susceptible target, and absence of capable 
guardianship results in victimization (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). Parental supervision in 
the form of physical guardianship and the use of antivirus software and other virtual 
forms of guardianship are effective in reducing cybervictimization (Kalia & Aleem, 
2017). Therefore, it is possible to extend routine activity theory to account for 
victimization in antispatial realms and constructs. 
Antispatial. The antispatial context of routine activity theory expands upon the 
original intentions of explaining how and why crimes occur in the physical realm and 
includes the immediate or eventual convergence of the offender and victim in a virtual 
realm. Routine activity theory is an effective framework for studying cybervictimization 
(Kalia & Aleem, 2017; Näsi, Räsänen, Kaakinen, Keipi, & Oksanen, 2017; Reyns, 
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Henson, & Fisher, 2016). Perpetual online exposure of potential targets to motivated 
offenders amplifies the threat of cybervictimization (Brady et al., 2016). A major 
challenge in routine activity theory and cybervictimization is identifying the parallels 
between motivated offenders and potential targets (Holt et al., 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 
2016). The digital nature of cybercrime exceeds the physical precepts initially introduced 
in routine activity theory and is why some researchers refute the use of routine activity 
theory in cybercrime research (Holt et al., 2016). Victimization in routine activity theory 
is a result of criminal opportunity and quantifying criminal opportunity in the antispatial 
realm is problematic (Brady et al., 2016). Regardless of the difficulties in quantifying 
criminal opportunity, it is possible to find relationships between opportunity and 
cybervictimization. 
Limitations on accurately reporting cybervictimization reinforce the need for 
exploring alternative methods to identify victimization correlates. Researchers use routine 
activity theory to remove the victim from the equation to determine the likelihood of a 
crime occurring (Wick et al., 2017). Researchers sometimes use routine activity theory in 
a polemic manner toward victim behavior (Arntfield, 2015). However, it remains unclear 
if the use of routine activity theory is effective in the study of cybercrime (Leukfeldt & 
Yar, 2016). Other researchers have found a positive relationship between routine online 
activities and online victimization (Paek & Nalla, 2015). Fraud and deceit often 
accompany criminal behavior in cyberspace (Agustina, 2015), and the effective use of 
routine activity theory in the cyberrealm requires an understanding of how, when, and 
where guardianship occurs within the context of the study (Reyns et al., 2016). 
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Identifying the guardianship elements of cybercrime is an alternative method of 
identifying the victimization correlates and overcoming the reporting limitations. 
Study alignment. Routine activity theory depicts the key constructs suitable for 
studying cybersecurity strategies relevant to the role of small business leadership in 
protecting business assets from the threat of ransomware. Precedence exists for extending 
the fundamental principles of routine activity theory into the antispatial realm. Empirical 
evidence indicates varying levels of the suitability of routine activity theory constructs 
and its applicability in the study of cybercrime victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). 
Nonetheless, the conceptual constructs facilitate an examination of guardianship, 
motivated offenders, and target suitability in cybercrime victimization. 
Routine Activity Theory Conceptual Constructs 
Conceptual constructs are useful in identifying the boundaries of data. Routine 
activity theory consists of three conceptual constructs: (a) guardianship, (b) suitable 
targets, and (c) motivated offenders (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). In the following sections, I 
discuss these three conceptual constructs as they apply to routine activity theory and the 
study of ransomware and cybersecurity. 
Guardianship. The effectiveness of applied guardianship differs depending on 
the environment. The effectiveness of guardianship varies depending on the applicability 
of guardianship to the phenomenon under study (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 2015). As 
technology evolves, researchers continue to explore tools that provide better guardianship 
to reduce and limit situational crime exposure (Brady et al., 2016). Researchers have 
determined through using routine activity theory the significant role of guardianship in 
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target suitability (Näsi, Oksanen, Keipi, & Räsänen, 2015). Guardianship is an evolving 
and moving target with direct implications for target suitability. 
Suitable targets. A suitable target is a prerequisite for cybervictimization to 
occur. Storing credit card information puts customers at perpetual risk of victimization 
(Brady et al., 2016). Target suitability includes an assumption of different dimensions 
based on the type of crime with a direct influence on victimization risk (Reyns & Henson, 
2016). A challenge for researchers without economic indicators of target attractiveness is 
the lack of documented measures to gauge target suitability (Reyns & Henson, 2016). 
Researchers using routine activity theory rely on valid indicators for unambiguous 
research (Wolfe, Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2016). Properly correlating victimization 
requires the identification of applicable indicators. Researchers select indicators and use 
suitable target constructs to identify target accessibility. 
Researchers identify the qualities of suitable targets to determine accessibility. 
The acronym VIVA represents value, inertia, visibility, and access to describe accessible 
targets (Nikitkov, Stone, & Miller, 2014). Motivated offenders’ attractions to potential 
victim characteristics develop from VIVA attributes (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). The 
elements of VIVA correlate to target suitability, with value as the most prominent 
predictable attribute (Wang et al., 2015). Properly understanding what makes a target 
suitable is relevant to understanding what motivates an offender and how victimization 
occurs. 
Value. The value of a target indicates the financial characteristics perceived as 
desirable by an attacker (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). The original definition of value in 
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routine activity theory referred to physical goods with an identifiable monetary value 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). In the online context, value refers to the monetary value of 
information assets or the digital representation of physical goods to facilitate exchange in 
the spatial realm (Wang et al., 2015). The value of regaining access to maliciously 
encrypted information assets represents the value component of a suitable ransomware 
target. 
Inertia. Researchers commonly attribute inertia to a physical characteristic of an 
object. The inertia of a target is more difficult to quantify in the digital realm than in the 
physical (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) omitted inertia from their 
cybercrime study for lack of correlation. Justifying the measurement of inertia of 
potential targets in cyberspace is difficult (Nikitkov et al., 2014). Nevertheless, a 
potential measurement of inertia for a ransomware target is the amount of target data the 
attacker will maliciously encrypt. 
Visibility. Visibility is necessary for target accessibility. The visibility of a target 
indicates target suitability (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Wang et al., 2015). In an online 
environment, visibility exists as online activities and behaviors (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 
2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Visibility depends on knowledge of where the target 
exists (Wang et al., 2015). The visibility of information assets connected to the Internet 
indicates potential targets. 
Access. Access refers to the accessibility of a target in a physical or virtual realm 
(Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). In an online context, digital system weaknesses increase 
accessibility (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). Ease of access increases target suitability 
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(Nikitkov et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). Therefore, an information asset connected to 
the Internet features increased accessibility to offenders probing for weaknesses. 
Motivated offenders. In the online environment, many motivated offenders exist. 
The presence of potential offenders in an online environment is enough to satisfy the 
requirements for motivated offenders in routine activity theory (Näsi et al., 2017). 
Routine activity theory does not require researchers to understand why motivated 
offenders choose to offend (Wang et al., 2015). Other frameworks exist to explain why 
motivated offenders choose to offend beyond just their existence. At the most 
fundamental level, cybersecurity research involving the Internet meets the existence 
requirement of the motivated offenders construct. 
Competing Theories 
Theorists are not bound to routine activity theory to address the multifaceted 
issues surrounding cybersecurity. Competing victimology theories include a focus on 
victim behavior to understand how and why crimes occur. In the past, theorists 
incorporated victim behavior by including routine activity theory with an additional 
theory or framework. 
Examples of competing victimology theories include routine activity theory in 
combination with another theory. One example included routine activity theory in 
conjunction with lifestyle theory. In lifestyle theory, researchers take victim behavior into 
account to build the probability of becoming a victim (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). 
Researchers build victim profiles using lifestyle theory to formulate risk (Agustina, 
2015). Combining routine activity theory with lifestyle theory extends the ability of the 
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researcher to consider victim behavior to understand the role of the victim in a criminal 
event. Cybersecurity theorists can more narrowly define the lifestyle portion of the theory 
to include behaviors only found in cyberspace. 
In the study of victimization occurring in the antispatial realm of cyberspace, 
victimology theories contain tools researchers can use to account for specific behaviors 
exhibited by victims that may result in victimization. In cyberroutine activity theory, 
researchers decide which online behaviors to examine to assist in determining the risk of 
online victimization in probabilistic terms (Choi & Lee, 2017). An example of an online 
behavior that increases the likelihood of victimization is remote risky purchasing where 
the victim conducts an online transaction with a previously unknown online business and 
becomes a victim of identity theft (Holtfreter, Reisig, Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2015). A 
commonality among integrated routine activity theories is partial blame attribution to the 
victim. 
Researchers also consider demographics in other competing integrated theories. 
The measurable variables of gender, race, and social class as a theoretical model in 
combination with routine activity theory provide researchers with insight into how 
oppressive factors influence victimization (Blasdell, 2015). Demographic factors are 
outside the locus of control of participants and provide a measurable variable for 
research. 
Researchers can use an integrated routine activity theory framework to find 
indicators rather than measurable variables. An integrated routine activity theory using 
protection motivation theory provides indicators of how victims fail to protect themselves 
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properly from online victimization (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). In a multiple integrated 
approach using routine activity theory, negative affectivity, and low self-control theory, 
lack of victim self-control did not play a role in indicating victimization (Kodellas et al., 
2015). Chen et al. (2017) integrated the extended process model, self-control theory, and 
routine activity theory to determine aspects of individuals who become Internet scam 
victims and found that individuals who adequately protected themselves mediated the 
potential of additional online criminological risk. Researchers have demonstrated the use 
of an integrated self-control and lifestyle-routine activity theory to suggest an effective 
strategy in preventing cybercrime (Ilievski, 2016). Researchers can combine theoretical 
frameworks to use different viewpoints, constructs, and indicators to understand 
cybercrime and suggest preventive measures. 
Potential rivals to routine activity theory exist as combined frameworks. Mui and 
Mailley (2015) were the first researchers to combine routine activity theory with the 
fraud triangle to research a fraud event. Cressey (1953) developed a primitive version of 
the fraud triangle to explain the conditions necessary for embezzlement and trust 
violation to occur. A comprehensive examination of a fraud event is possible when 
combining the perpetrator-centric focus of the fraud triangle and environment variables 
of routine activity theory (Mui & Mailley, 2015). Decoupling routine activity theory from 
the fraud triangle narrows the focus to the perpetrator and diminishes the usefulness of 




Fraud. Fraud is one component of the broader topic of crime. A perpetrator can 
commit a crime by force, deceit, or imprudence (Agustina, 2015). In classical 
criminological research, fraud refers to crime against assets rather than an individual and 
may require additional thought when investigating the same type of crime in the 
cyberrealm (Agustina, 2015). It is necessary to understand how the consequences of a 
crime committed in the cyberrealm intersect with the physical world for classification as 
fraud (Agustina, 2015). Fraud does not occur only in the physical realm. 
The fraud triangle. The fraud triangle contains a competitive model while also 
remaining useful as a complement to routine activity theory. The three perpetrator-
focused components of the fraud triangle in forensic accounting are perceived pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization (Omidi, Min, & Omidi, 2017; Reinstein & Taylor, 2017; 
Roden, Cox, & Kim, 2016; Rodgers, Söderbom, & Guiral, 2015). Perceived pressure 
involves a financial motivation (Roden et al., 2016). In the financial realm, fences serve 
as a mechanism to limit opportunity (Reinstein & Taylor, 2017). Reducing perpetrators’ 
cognitive dissonance supports rationalization through perceptions, information, judgment, 
and decisions (Rodgers et al., 2015). The fraud triangle contains the components 
necessary to investigate a fraud event within a corporate setting. 
Studies in which researchers used the fraud triangle to investigate fraud within the 
corporate setting are different in approach and findings to studies in which researchers 
used routine activity theory. At the country level, it is possible to predict the incidence of 
fraud based on increases or decreases in the service, industrial, and manufacturing share 
of gross domestic product (Omidi et al., 2017). Researchers have found that to reduce the 
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chance of fraudulent corporate behavior, it is best to avoid having a chief executive 
officer and chairman of the board serving in a dual-role capacity (Roden et al., 2016). 
Similarly, incentive-based compensation strategies and the presence of women and 
outside directors reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud (Roden et al., 2016). Structured 
fences in the corporate realm protect accounting professionals from committing fraud and 
engaging in unethical behavior (Reinstein & Taylor, 2017). An embedded ethical process 
design tree consisting of perception, information, judgment, and decision inside the fraud 
triangle provides managers a tool set for placing controls to cope with ethical situations 
effectively (Rodgers et al., 2015). Investigating ransomware from an ethical standpoint 
may not be the best way to address the issue of fraud and ransomware; however, fraud is 
a component of cybersecurity. 
To perform a scholarly categorization of cyberfraud within the cyberrealm, I will 
examine how previous researchers defined fraud within the cybercontext. One type of 
cyberfraud is online auction fraud (Arntfield, 2015). In 2013, online auctions of 
automobiles garnered one of the most online auction complaints (Brady et al., 2016). 
Consumer cyberfraud occurs when an attacker fails to fulfill a purchase made online or 
misrepresents a product or good (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Online auction deception and 
cyberfraud decreased as auction cyberfraud controls improved (Nikitkov et al., 2014). 
Online auction cyberfraud controls and accounting fences are similar in protecting 
unwilling participants from fraud victimization. 
Cyberfraud exists and is perpetrated using methods other than through online 
auctions. Identity theft victimization is another type of cyberfraud perpetrated online 
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(Holtfreter et al., 2015). Failing to properly protect privacy leads to increased Internet 
scam victimization that results in fraud (Chen et al., 2017). Identity cyberfraud occurs 
when attackers either steal or create a fake identity to commit the fraud with or without 
the use of malware to intercept victim credentials (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Once an 
attacker is in possession of the potential victim’s identity, it becomes easier to convince 
or lure the victim into clicking malicious links or downloading malicious payloads. 
Cyberfraud beyond online auctions includes other potential victims and 
victimization risks. The interconnected environment of the Internet puts online retailers 
and online shoppers at risk of becoming targets for cyberfraud (Brady et al., 2016). 
Cybervictimization and enhanced risks result from identity cyberfraud and consumer 
cyberfraud from financial crimes perpetrated by attackers communicating with victims 
using e-mail, Internet auction sites, or a website (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). How victims 
interact with technology can increase the risk of victimization (Nobles, 2018). Routine 
behavior of using the Internet for checking e-mail, shopping, and browsing the web is 
enough to become a victim of cyberfraud. 
Attackers attempt regular communications to gather intelligence and further 
perpetrate cybervictimization. Fraudulent e-mails designed to collect and steal 
information from recipients is one way perpetrators phish for information to perpetrate 
victimization (Holtfreter et al., 2015). Attackers conduct phishing scams using phone 
calls, e-mails, instant messages, and text messages (Paek & Nalla, 2015). Bank fraud 
phishing victims give security codes, passwords, or remote access to their personal 
devices to attackers, regardless of protective measures in place, and inadvertently allow 
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the transfer of money out of the victims’ bank account (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). The 
act of responding to an attacker might lead to a more serious cybervictimization event 
with factors that might make a potential victim more susceptible to becoming a target for 
cyberfraud. 
Measures exist to calculate the risk of targets becoming victims and to avoid 
becoming a victim of cyberfraud. Low self-control leads to a higher risk of online 
consumer cyberfraud (Ilievski, 2016). A correlation exists between low self-control with 
a higher frequency of online shopping and becoming a victim of cyberfraud (Chen et al., 
2017). One way to determine a potential victims’ susceptibility to cyberfraud is by 
measuring self-control. A lack of self-control might be indicated by those willing to make 
risky investments; high self-control might be indicated by those with an increased 
awareness and understanding of Internet privacy (Chen et al., 2017). Fraud within the 
cyberrealm refers to either consumer cyberfraud or identity cyberfraud as a single facet of 
an interconnected cybercriminal model, which complicates the measurement of 
calculated risk. 
It is possible to reduce the complications of measuring risk using routine activity 
theory to limit the effects of victim behavior and remove the need to understand the 
criminal actor. Routine activity theory is flexible and extensible, and it integrates with 
other theoretical frameworks. The ability to extend routine activity theory into cyberspace 
allows researchers to study cybercrime without blaming the victim or without having in-
depth knowledge of the criminal actor. A narrow focus on ransomware, which is a crime 
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occurring in cyberspace, is well-suited for a study that includes the routine activity 
framework as a theoretical lens of investigative inquiry. 
Study of Ransomware 
The study of ransomware began as a novel thought experiment that included a 
proposal regarding the potentially destructive nature of two previously unrelated 
disciplines. Young and Yung (2017) provided a background of over 20 years of research 
into cryptovirology and cryptovirology ransomware. Young and Yung initially proved 
that previously scrutinized and mocked research on cryptovirology was factual based on 
the initial cooperative efforts between a former hacker and cryptographer, circa 1995, as 
publicity of ransomware infections grew. Those who lack the understanding of the 
sophistication, formidability, and nature of ransomware have downplayed the reality of 
the threat of ransomware (Young & Yung, 2017). A lack of regard to the threat of 
ransomware creates potential victims of the innovator’s dilemma by neglecting the 
proactivity required in staying ahead of the threats and risks associated with ransomware 
(Young & Yung, 2017). Successful cybersecurity strategies address the factors that 
explain why one potential target is more likely to suffer harm and become a victim of 
ransomware than another. 
The mystery of how a malicious payload like ransomware presents itself can pose 
a challenge to end users of technology. A lack of standardization, the increase in Internet 
use, the popularity of mobile devices, and the monetization of malware help to explain 
the growth of ransomware (Fanning, 2015). Increased internet usage was found to have a 
positive influence on the frequency of ransomware infection (Bergmann, Dreißigacker, 
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Skarczinski, & Wollinger, 2018). Compounding the ransomware problem are curious 
individuals with minimal experience who have access to freely available and distributable 
malware (Fanning, 2015). Once a ransomware infection is successful, it becomes more 
destructive to attempt its removal than to pay the extortion, which leaves the victim at the 
mercy of the perpetrator (Young & Yung, 2017). A lack of remedial options against 
ransomware creates a one-sided relationship where a significant benefit exists in 
preventing the infection and taking a proactive cybersecurity stance. 
Opportunities exist to improve a business’s security posture against ransomware 
while also increasing awareness and improving the reactiveness against new and 
emerging cybersecurity threats. Small business leaders are uniquely able to adapt to new 
and emerging cybersecurity threats more efficiently than leaders of larger organizations 
with more complex information systems (Paulsen, 2016). Small business leaders with a 
proactive cybersecurity posture make themselves more attractive to customers concerned 
about cybersecurity (Paulsen, 2016). A lack of awareness and an inadequate 
cybersecurity posture is more detrimental to small businesses’ survivability than larger 
firms’ survivability with regard to how a single breach might bankrupt a small business 
with limited resources (Fanning, 2015). Given the high stakes involved with small 
business and the permanently destructive potential of ransomware, an argument in favor 
of a proactive cybersecurity approach, rather than relying on reactive measures and 
reporting the crime to law enforcement after the occurrence, is the only solution to 
circumvent initial loss. 
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One unique characteristic of ransomware compared to other types of infections is 
that the attacker demands payment for remediation. When an attacker encrypts files and 
demands payment, the infection is classified as ransomware (Hampton, Baig, & Zeadally, 
2018). The preferred method of payment to decrypt files encrypted by ransomware is 
through the electronic currency Bitcoin (Brown, 2016). The Bitcoin transaction ledger is 
freely accessible to all Bitcoin users and allows law enforcement to discover the identity 
of the responsible party (Brown, 2016). The lack of a central authority and the trustless 
nature of Bitcoin allow a sender to send Bitcoins to a recipient without disclosing the 
identity of either party (Ortolani, 2016). Law enforcement must triangulate the 
pseudonyms visible in the public ledger, also known as the blockchain, with other online 
records to attempt to identify the attacker (Brown, 2016). The success rate of identifying 
the criminal actor is questionable and does nothing to mitigate or reverse the damages 
caused by the ransomware infection. 
The complex and public nature of reported ransomware incidents emboldens 
attackers and creates alarm for potential victims. Gareth (2016) opined that news 
coverage of ransomware attacks, increased reliance on digital records, and increased 
sophistication in ransomware increase negative effects from infection. Simms (2016) 
described how ransomware is capable of residing on systems without detection for 
extended periods to encrypt system backups to limit victim remediation options. 
Protecting system backups are important for successfully recovering from a ransomware 
infection without paying the attacker (Thomas & Galligher, 2018). Mature 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin further complicate ransomware infection and shield the 
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identity of the attacker (Gareth, 2016). As publicity of ransomware increases and the 
underlying technology improves, the damage potential of ransomware becomes more 
severe. 
The scope and destruction of ransomware are traceable. Targeted ransomware 
attacks have higher damage potential with more substantial ransoms (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2016). Federal law enforcement reported ransomware infection rates are 
likely a misrepresentation of the number of actual infections because many infections go 
unreported (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Researchers at the Internet Crime 
Complaint Center collect ransomware complaints and disseminates this information to 
local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies (Internet Crime 
Complaint Center, 2016). An estimated 15% of Internet crime victims in the United 
States report their crimes to law enforcement (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016). 
The suggestion that ransomware is underreported indicates a challenge in understanding 
the extent of damage as a result of ransomware attacks. 
Damage from ransomware infection varies by ransomware strain and is not 
limited to a single technology. The most destructive strain of ransomware is the 
cryptoviral variant that involves encrypting files and folders to prevent the owner from 
reading them (Choudhary et al., 2016; Richardson & North, 2017). The less destructive 
version of ransomware is the locker variant where the information system remains 
unencrypted but perpetrators place the owner behind a locked screen that prevents access 
to files on the system (Choudhary et al., 2016). Ransomware has evolved beyond 
computers and is also capable of infecting mobile phones (Brody, Chang, & Schoenberg, 
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2018; Choudhary et al., 2016). Ransomware infection is a threat to information systems 
and other devices with embedded operating systems. 
Ransomware and Routine Activity Theory Constructs 
The three primary routine activity theory constructs are present in the study of 
ransomware and business. Themes as applied to ransomware include offenders, targets, 
target value, target protection, and victim behavior. Of these constructs and themes, 
offenders who obfuscate their identities might be the most difficult to identify and access 
in a business environment. 
Ransomware offenders. Ransomware offenders are the criminal actors who 
perpetrate attacks against suitable ransomware targets. Without a motivated ransomware 
offender, routine activity theory indicates there is no crime. Ransomware offenders can 
either randomly choose targets or selectively choose targets to victimize. 
Ransomware offenders attempt to evade discovery by law enforcement with 
digital cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Digital cryptocurrency transactions are openly 
exchanged and recorded in a public ledger (Ortolani, 2016). The public ledger, referenced 
as a blockchain, exists in a peer-to-peer system to bypass conventional financial 
institution and government regulations (Ortolani, 2016). Attackers use ransomware to 
infect information systems and hold the data hostage by demanding payment in exchange 
for a decryption key (Genç et al., 2017; Kharraz et al., 2015; Young & Yung, 2017). 
Bitcoin supports automated scripting to facilitate electronic payment transactions 
(Ortolani, 2016). Attackers can take advantage of the scripting features available in 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin to automate the entire ransomware extortion process. 
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Ransomware targets. Ransomware targets are the data storage systems of 
potential victims, and ransomware targets are a necessary element for crime. The online 
behavior of potential ransomware victims may play a role in target suitability. 
Ransomware targets consist of potential victims willing to pay extortions to criminal 
actors. 
Ransomware target value. Ransomware target value changes based on 
selectivity factors and perceived value of the data deprived from victims. If data have no 
value, then victims may not be willing to pay extortions. Depending on the value of the 
data on the data storage system, potential victims may implement measures to protect the 
data prior to a ransomware attack. 
Ransomware target protection. Ransomware target protection consists of 
protecting the underlying data storage system where the data reside. If no ransomware 
target protection exists, it may decrease the difficulty for a criminal actor to comprise the 
data storage system. Researchers do not know if privacy protection behaviors are 
effective in mitigating a potential ransomware attack (Chen et al., 2017). Personal 
capable guardianship and technical capable guardianship are not significant in cybercrime 
victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Target protection efforts are no longer viable after 
ransomware compromises an underlying data storage system. 
Theory Comparisons 
Researchers routinely conduct qualitative metasynthesis studies to explore routine 
activity theory to understand cybervictimization. Wang et al. (2015) operationalized 
routine activity theory with survival modeling to determine that victimization risk is 
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highest from individuals within an organization. Pratt and Turanovic (2016) found an 
implied nonprobabilistic view of cybervictimization using routine activity theory. 
Agustina (2015) researched cybervictimization in Spain to explore victim threat 
mitigation strategies. Agustina operationalized protection efforts in table form to 
understand that victimization risk and determined risk controls play a significant role in 
preventing victimization. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) compared study participants to 
determine the applicability of the elements of routine activity theory and victimization 
risk. Leukfeldt and Yar determined visibility is the most prominently observed element 
with a significant influence on cybercrime victimization. Leukfeldt and Yar also revealed 
no clear indication of the applicability of accessibility and personal capable guardianship 
with value. Leukfeldt and Yar found technical capable guardianship was not significant. 
Blasdell (2015) applied an intersectional approach using a demographic lens to determine 
higher victimization risk among marginalized populations. Arntfield (2015) conducted a 
meta-analysis of victimology studies using a lens of cyberbullying and routine activity 
theory to theorize how the anonymous nature of cyberspace can facilitate deviant and 
criminal behavior. Ilievski (2016) referenced 57 research articles, drew six main 
conclusions about lifestyle routine activity theory, and found a significant link did not 
exist between protective measures and victimization risk. Ilievski noted large samples 
support the effectiveness of lifestyle routine activity theory over routine activity theory to 
explain cybercrime and cybervictimization. Qualitative metasynthesis studies involving 
routine activity theory share a common theme that includes the utility of routine activity 
theory and victim risk assessment. 
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Cybercrime victims are not limited to adults aged 18 and over. Wolfe et al. (2016) 
conducted a telephone survey with random dialing of 800 nationally representative 
adolescents aged 12 to 17 and their parents. Wolfe et al. reduced the total number of 
participants to 625 teenagers with cellphones after applying eligibility criteria and found 
routine activity theory effective for studying and explaining victimization in the 
cyberrealm. Näsi et al. (2015) studied cybercrime victimization among young people 
using a four-country sample of 3,506 teenagers and young adults from the ages of 15 to 
30 with slander and threat of violence as the most observed cybervictimization. Näsi et al. 
further delineated the results by demographics and used logistic regression models to test 
the previous four-country sample of teenagers and young adults to determine exposure to 
offenders as a significant predictor of cybercrime victimization. Kalia and Aleem (2017) 
determined the differences between victims and nonvictims of 200 high school students 
were target suitability and parental supervision using routine activity theory and 
cybervictimization. Cybercrime researchers delimit studies using demographics as a 
differentiator outside the control of participants. 
Some researchers pool together participants to delimit victim behavior research 
and interpret findings. Wick et al. (2017) conducted an online survey using 298 
university students enrolled in introductory psychology courses in a southwestern state. 
Wick et al. used an independent sample t test, correlations, and hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis. Choi and Lee (2017) performed a theoretical analysis of 
cyberinterpersonal violence victimization and offending using cyberroutine activity 
theory. Choi and Lee determined participating in risky online leisure activity increased 
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the likelihood of cyberinterpersonal violence. Reyns et al. (2016) performed a 
dichotomous codification of responses using self-report survey data to determine that 
offline guardianship was ineffective when compared to online target hardening. 
Delimiting research makes it possible for researchers to go outside the bounds of routine 
activity theory and focus on victim behavior. 
Researchers collect data from existing surveys to test constructs of routine activity 
theory. Reyns (2015) focused on Internet victimization as a construct of routine activity 
theory using survey data. Reyns measured the constructs of the routine activity 
framework after operationalizing dichotomous survey response data as victims of hacking 
and malware or victims of phishing to find that online behavior directly correlated with 
victimization. Reyns and Henson (2016) combined efforts using the same sample data to 
study online identity theft victimization with routine activity theory and found risky online 
behavior correlated with an increased chance of identity theft victimization. Researchers 
can use routine activity theory constructs to determine if victim behavior directly relates 
to online identity theft. 
Behavior and personality are testable within routine activity theory. Vries and 
Gelder (2015) conducted an investigation using routine activity theory to determine 
personality as a predictor of crime. Nikitkov et al. (2014) compared routine activity 
triangle with motivated offender as the element connecting routine activity to the fraud 
triangle of deceptive eBay seller activity. Holtfreter et al. (2015) explored how low self-
control contributes to making risky remote-purchase decisions and subsequently 
contributes to identity theft victimization. Chen et al. (2017) determined that individuals 
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willing to participate in risky online investments, participate in online shopping, and open 
e-mails from untrusted parties increased the likelihood of Internet scam victimization. 
One trend in routine activity theory research in the online realm is examining victim 
behavior correlates. 
Combining routine activity theory with other theoretical constructs is an effective 
way to study routine activity theory in different environmental contexts. Mui and Mailley 
(2015) created a theoretical perspective of one perpetrator misappropriating assets 
mapped to the crime triangle of routine activity theory, with the fraud triangle as an 
overlay for an environmental perspective. Kodellas et al. (2015) determined low self-
control was not significant in predicting physical or property victimization in the 
workplace using routine activity theory. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) studied phishing 
and malware victims who were online banking customers in the Netherlands and 
determined that everyone is susceptible to banking fraud victimization, with target 
suitability having a slight influence on the likelihood of victimization. Not all researchers 
have attributed victim behavior to victimization risk. 
Archived reports of victimization support testing elements of routine activity 
theory. Holt et al. (2016) used global computer emergency response team reports of 
malware infections as total reported accounts of malware infection with macrocorrelates 
of malware infection at the national level and found that countries with a more advanced 
technological infrastructure were more likely to report malware infection. Brady et al. 
(2016) redefined household activity ratio to trend financial cybercrime victimization to 
demonstrate that those completing financial transactions online were at higher risk of 
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victimization. Paek and Nalla (2015) lacked data points related to guardianship but found 
a correlation between victims receiving phishing attempts and identity theft and noted 
that underreporting may exist because victims may not be aware that they are victims. 
Regardless of the quality of archived victim reports, it is possible that missing data might 
prevent an accurate representation of the scope of cybervictimization or victims of 
ransomware. 
Cybersecurity 
Effective strategies to address ransomware exist within cybersecurity. 
Cybersecurity is the strategy organizational leaders use to protect digital assets from harm 
(Haimes, Horowitz, Guo, Andrijcic, & Bogdanor, 2015). Cybersecurity is relevant from 
national security interests to local businesses in enabling the long-term success of the 
digital economy (Teoh & Mahmood, 2017). Retail business cybersecurity target risks 
include people, data, and intellectual property (Densham, 2015). When discussing 
cybersecurity, it becomes necessary to define who they are protecting, what they are 
defending, and how to protect the target; targets exist within the confines of personal 
information, critical infrastructure, e-commerce, military threats, and intellectual property 
(Carr, 2016). A motivated offender is the last component needed to fulfill the 
requirements of routine activity theory as an investigative lens in cybersecurity. 
The basis of cybersecurity strategy is the threat of the existence of motivated 
offenders. Motivated criminal actors use fraud to deceive victims and penetrate 
vulnerable systems (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). Critical business and government 
functions exist online and are susceptible to attack (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). The 
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ability of cybercriminals to pose a threat from a distance complicates cybersecurity 
strategy and jurisdiction boundaries (Williams & Levi, 2015). Multiple attack vectors 
further complicate cybersecurity strategy. 
Cybersecurity strategy implications affect how companies conduct business. The 
importance of the private sector in cybersecurity initiatives dominates the cybersecurity 
initiative discussion, as business leaders’ in the private sector maintain and operate 85–
90% of cyberinfrastructure (Štitilis, Pakutinskas, Laurinaitis, & Malinauskaitė-van de 
Castel, 2017). Cybersecurity strategy and application vary between companies due to a 
lack of standardization in documenting and applying cybersecurity strategy (Štitilis, 
Pakutinskas, Kinis, & Malinauskaitė, 2016). Employees with personal devices on the 
corporate network, customer expectations, and poor communication with upper 
management weaken cybersecurity (Patel, 2015). Effective cybersecurity strategy 
requires engaging stakeholders to satisfy operational requirements. 
Determining the best method to incorporate cybersecurity into business strategy is 
challenging. Cybersecurity requirements change based on the value and sensitivity of the 
data (Goutas, Sutanto, & Aldarbesti, 2016). A significant challenge for business leaders is 
continually aligning business strategy and technology in unstable environments 
(Hinkelmann et al., 2016). Lacking a proper cybersecurity strategy is a business formula 
for inevitable failure (Goutas et al., 2016). Available cybersecurity tools and the methods 
used in organizations to store and retrieve information are incapable of protecting data 
and resources from criminal actors (German, 2016). Cybercriminals captured over 600 
million U.S. customer financial records from the retail sector in 2013 and 2014, and most 
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breaches have occurred since 2007 (Hemphill & Longstreet, 2016). A lack of cohesion 
between cybersecurity and business strategy is detrimental to operations and to 
maintaining a positive public image. 
The depth and scope of a cybersecurity strategy contains specific and measureable 
characteristics and provides accountability for failure. Characteristics of an effective 
cybersecurity strategy are multiple perspectives, support from senior staff, behavior and 
awareness training, internal and external information-sharing alliances, and staying up to 
date with best practices (Esteves, Ramalho, & Haro, 2017). A weak link in cybersecurity 
is the employee (Manworren, Letwat, & Daily, 2016). Organizations with vulnerability 
intelligence of attackable targets have an advantage in mitigating cybersecurity threats 
(Smyth, 2016). Strategic management of cybersecurity strategy requires the identification 
of capabilities and resources to increase organizational performance by continually 
improving and adapting the cybersecurity strategy (Azevedo et al., 2015). Measureable 
characteristics of cybersecurity strategy include the defining terms and common uses of 
the term cybersecurity, which encompass a range of semantics with risk, asset, and 
environment as the most common (Schatz, Bashroush, & Wall, 2017). Designing an 
effective cybersecurity strategy requires a holistic understanding of an organization. 
Applying routine activity theory to cybersecurity strategy requires the 
identification of available constructs. The available constructs exist within prior research 




Cybersecurity offenders. Cybersecurity offenders, similar to ransomware 
offenders, are the criminal actors who perpetrate attacks against cybertargets. Without a 
cybersecurity offender, there is no crime (Näsi et al., 2017). Cybersecurity offenders can 
either randomly choose targets or selectively choose targets to victimize. 
Cybersecurity targets. Cybersecurity targets are cybertargets consisting of the 
information systems or technology of potential victims. Cybersecurity targets are a 
necessary element for cybercrime (Näsi et al., 2017). Behavior of potential cybersecurity 
victims may play a role in target suitability. Cybersecurity targets consist of potential 
victims who lack adequate training or protection. 
Cybersecurity target value. Cybersecurity target value changes based on 
selectivity factors and perceived value of the attack. The influence of the perceived target 
value remains unknown (Näsi et al., 2017). Depending on the value of the information 
systems or technology, the potential victim may implement measures to safeguard their 
systems. 
Cybersecurity target protection. Cybersecurity target protection consists of 
protecting or taking adequate precautions to protect owned information systems or 
technology. If no target protection exists, it may lessen the difficulty for a criminal actor 
to compromise the system or technology (Näsi et al., 2017). Whether cybersecurity target 
protection is effective in mitigating a potential attack remains unknown. 
Cybersecurity and ransomware. Similarities exist between cybersecurity and 
ransomware in their application to routine activity theory; however, the relationship 
between cybersecurity and ransomware is distinct and does not share all qualities equally. 
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Ransomware is a component of cybersecurity, and researchers expect to observe shared 
qualities between spatial and antispatial routine activity research (Näsi et al., 2017). In 
the context of business and effective business strategy, additional implications to 
adequate protection may exist. 
Strategic Management and Ransomware Cybersecurity 
The strategic management of information systems and technology has a role in the 
adequate protection and guardianship constructs of routine activity theory. Companies 
have a global market of cybersecurity networks to assist in strategically managing 
cybersecurity (Bailetti & Zijdemans, 2014). Cybersecurity start-up companies offer 
holistic security solutions, digital identity protection, security automation, distributed 
security, integration services, password products, security simulation and testing, and 
training (Bailetti & Zijdemans, 2014). Strategic risk management plans contain 
provisions for unexpected technology failures (Fraser & Simkins, 2016). Strategically 
managing costs associated with cybersecurity includes properly classifying costs related 
to testing versus implementation of cybersecurity tools and strategies (Radziwill & 
Benton, 2017). Strategically managing cybersecurity requires establishing a budget to 
protect digital company assets from cybercriminals. 
The strategic management of cybersecurity is critical in connected company 
information systems and technology. Over the past 10 years of strategic management of 
cybersecurity, cybersecurity failures have cost companies billions of dollars (Hooper & 
McKissack, 2016). The strategic management of cybersecurity includes electronic 
information security management systems and proactively monitoring the influence of 
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cybersecurity programs on the performance and productivity of the workforce (Baronienė 
& Žirgutis, 2017). The practice of strategic risk management leads to resiliency within 
company operations (Fraser & Simkins, 2016). In large organizations, a separate position 
outside the IT department oversees cybersecurity; however, in smaller organizations 
typically the corporate information officer handles the strategic management of 
cybersecurity (Hooper & McKissack, 2016). Small business owners use cloud 
technologies to stay competitive (Forde, 2017). Business leaders responsible for 
overseeing cybersecurity handle the strategic management of cybersecurity and internal 
structure with different internal and external controls depending on the size and structure 
of the organization (Hooper & McKissack, 2016). The tenets of strategic cybersecurity 
management align with routine activity theory in networked company information 
systems. 
Ransomware and Business 
The threat of ransomware is high, with devastating consequences in the event of a 
successful breach to business information systems. Attackers using cryptovirology are 
responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars in losses annually, and they continue to 
evolve ransomware technology to circumvent systems designed to protect information 
systems while eluding law enforcement with cryptocurrency payouts anonymized in the 
blockchain (Richardson & North, 2017). The success of the cryptovirology criminal 
enterprise indicates a failure in preventing successful attacks. The routine activity theory 




Figure 1. Routine activity theory as applied to the study of ransomware. 
Figure 1 depicts the elements necessary for ransomware offenders to circumvent 
protection, a lack of adequate guardianship, and subsequent compromise of the target 
information system. The element of adequate guardianship is a primary focus for research 
involving cybersecurity threats and routine activity theory. A lack of innovation in 
maintaining adequate protection against ransomware creates opportunity for offenders to 
extort their victims (Richardson & North, 2017; Young & Yung, 2017). The lack of 
adequate guardianship or protection against ransomware infection is relevant, within the 
confines of routine activity theory, if a motivated offender and target exist. 
Small business leaders use specific strategies to provide adequate guardianship, 
limit target visibility, and prevent motivated offenders from compromising the target. 
Some small business leaders lack strategies to address ransomware and assume adequate 
cybersecurity protection is in place. The codification of small business leader 
cybersecurity strategies as active or passive is relevant to the study of cybersecurity 
strategy. Within the confines of active or passive cybersecurity strategy, unique elements 
might exist in addressing ransomware infection that apply to other attack vectors outside 
the scope of ransomware. 
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Predicting the thematic development and codification of the effective strategies 
small business leaders use to address ransomware involves bounding relevant data. In 
case study research, bounding the data and operationalizing conceptual measures improve 
quality (Yin, 2018). Exploring small business leaders’ strategies for effectively 
addressing ransomware using the routine activity theory construct of adequate 
guardianship might reveal direct and indirect influential factors that affect the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity strategy. Identifying how small business leaders influence 
the organizational cybersecurity posture might lead to a rich understanding of how small 
business leaders directly and indirectly mitigate the threat of ransomware in small 
business information systems. 
The evolution of ransomware creates a moving target for small business leaders 
concerned with maintaining adequate protection for their information systems. Adequate 
protection entails using the latest operating systems, staying up-to-date on operating 
system patches, maintaining on-site and off-site backups, and actively monitoring 
vulnerable operating system components with antimalware software (Choudhary et al., 
2016; Richardson & North, 2017). The latest Microsoft operating system, Windows 10, 
was effective in preventing ransomware infection in laboratory tests using variants from 
the 25 known families of ransomware (Choudhary et al., 2016). The majority of 
ransomware infections originate from unsuspecting users clicking on infected links or 
opening infected attachments in e-mail (Richardson & North, 2017). Strategies that may 
influence the use of e-mail, data backups, using the latest operating systems, and 
promoting the use of antivirus or antimalware protection in the organization are 
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potentially significant to studying ransomware infection in small business information 
systems. 
Operationalizing Routine Activity Theory Constructs 
Operationalizing the constructs of routine activity theory in the context of small 
business information systems and ransomware will allow for the clear identification of 
relevant data and themes encountered during codification of the research data. Proper 
identification of contextual constructs benefits analysis (Yin, 2018). The contextual 
constructs of routine activity theory include motivated offenders, targets, and adequate 
guardianship. 
Motivated offenders. Research data might contain information about small 
business leaders understanding the inherent risks involved in using information systems, 
the Internet, and the presence of motivated offenders. Knowledge of why motivated 
offenders choose to behave in a criminal manner is not a prerequisite of routine activity 
theory (Wang et al., 2015). Information systems exposed to the Internet inherit a 
precursory qualification of inclusion in the motivated offender construct (Näsi et al., 
2017). A lack of a priori knowledge of motivated offenders does not predicate the 
presence or absence of motivated offenders targeting small business information systems; 
however, the common utility of small business information systems connected to the 
Internet justifies the assumption of the existence of motivated offenders threatening the 
cyberenvironment. 
 Targets. Understanding the components of a small business information system 
targeted by motivated offenders allows for proper identification of the prerequisites 
46 
 
required for adequate protection. Unpatched or outdated operating systems are vulnerable 
targets to ransomware infections (Choudhary et al., 2016; Richardson & North, 2017). 
The importance of maintaining up-to-date infrastructure is evident in avoiding the 
transformation of a target into a compromised target. A focus on the types of operating 
systems in use at a small business will provide data to determine target risk and factors of 
adequate guardianship for data existing on the small business information system. 
 Targets exhibit certain behaviors that may increase target viability and 
subsequently increase victimization risk. The act of having information systems 
connected to the Internet or the use of information systems in general is enough to satisfy 
the requirement of a target when using routine activity theory. The original precepts of 
routine activity theory do not indicate an influence on victimization based on the 
difference between someone leaving the home, and someone leaving the home and 
engaging in risky behavior (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). The ease of establishing a proper 
definition of a suitable target in cyberspace does not mitigate the problematic antispatial 
nature of the cyberrealm (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). However, operationalizing victim 
behavior is useful in determining risk for victimization among computer users (Holtfreter 
et al., 2015). The problematic nature of examining a target in the antispatial realm 
increases the usefulness of operationalizing victim behavior in determining victimization 
risk. 
 VIVA. VIVA contains attributes to categorize target victimization risk. The 
attributes of the VIVA proposition are value, inertia, visibility, and access relevant in the 
operationalization of constructs of accessible targets (Nikitkov et al., 2014). If the 
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primary focus is on adequate guardianship of accessible targets; opportunity exists to 
explore possible correlates of VIVA with adequate guardianship. An example of potential 
correlates in a small business environment might consist of company documents 
indicating value, number of employees indicating inertia, online web presence indicating 
visibility, and information system security posture combined with system architectures to 
indicate access. 
 Relative VIVA attributes are identifiable based on the context of the study 
environment. Not all data stored on a small business information system share the same 
amount of value. To calculate value, data must have monetary worth in the spatial realm 
(Wang et al., 2015). Determining the monetary value of small business information data 
is not a requirement for establishing target suitability. The number of employees may 
have an influence on inertia, as a small business with more employees may have fewer 
employees using computers and generating data; however, a small business with more 
employees has potentially more human resource data than a small business with fewer 
employees, which is a possible interesting difference. Difficulty exists in measuring and 
quantifying inertia in the cybercontext (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 
2016). Visibility, however, is a precursor to understanding target suitability. A potential 
cyberattacker might discover a suitable target based on evidence of the potential victims’ 
online footprint and location (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Wang et 
al., 2015). Lack of adequate guardianship predisposes visible targets to increased 
victimization risk (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Nikitkov et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). In 
the cybercontext, not all VIVA attributes share the same applicability. 
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 Adequate guardianship. Within the context of the study, target protection is 
analogous to adequate guardianship. Adequate guardianship against Internet-based 
attacks routinely takes the form of sophisticated firewalls, encryption, installing and 
updating protection software, and educating users of risks associated with e-mail 
(Holtfreter et al., 2015). Active target protection must satisfy the requirements necessary 
to prevent ransomware infection. Continual monitoring for changes in the file system and 
registry is one prerequisite for adequate active target protection against ransomware 
infection (Choudhary et al., 2016). The role of passive target protection is similar but 
identified differently from active target protection. Small business leaders’ support for 
maintaining up-to-date infrastructure, budget allocation to information systems, and 
cybersecurity concern or lack thereof are examples of possible evidence of passive target 
protection. Adequate guardianship justification contains both active and passive 
elements. 
Thematic development. Observed themes in routine activity theory include 
passive and active components mapped to the theory constructs of motivated offenders, 
suitable targets, and lack of adequate guardianship. Active component constructs might 
consist of the presence of publicly identifiable information about the business, public 
listing of e-mail addresses, internal security software features, and proactive target 
hardening initiatives. Passive component constructs might consist of data collected 
during an interview process directly from the interview participant. It is then important to 
identify and segregate any thematic development from outside bounded research to 
provide additional context for rival explanations.  
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Rivals. For rival explanations, researchers can remain within the constructs of 
routine activity theory to posit that motivated offenders or suitable targets might provide 
a better explanation of why a target becomes compromised than adequate protection. It is 
possible an overlap exists between suitable target and adequate protection; discerning 
between adequate protection with target hardening and the existence of a target is 
necessary to avoid improper attribution. A possible rival explanation not contained in 
routine activity theory is that the victim is at fault. Considering the totality of 
circumstances surrounding ransomware, it is possible to avoid victim blaming and instead 
choose a victim empowerment perspective using adequate guardianship and remain 
within the bounds of routine activity theory. The fraud triangle is another possible rival to 
confirm or refute rival suitability. Identifying and exploring possible rivals is a necessary 
component of exemplary qualitative case study research (Yin, 2018). The goal of a 
researcher conducting exemplary qualitative case study research is not to favor the 
predicted outcome by collecting only the data necessary to confirm predicted outcomes or 
to consider all possible rivals. The objective of the researcher is to collect and analyze 
data without bias to achieve quality, rigor, and trustworthy conclusions. 
The motivated offender construct is difficult to extrapolate in the context of 
strategies to address ransomware. An unlimited number of motivated offenders exist on 
the Internet as people and automated algorithms that participate in random and targeted 
criminal acts toward individuals or organizations (Brady et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017; 
Holtfreter et al., 2015; Näsi et al., 2017). Identifying the presence of a motivated offender 
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without understanding the inclination toward criminal behavior weakens the rival 
explanatory position in explaining strategies to address ransomware. 
The suitable target construct is likewise difficult to generalize in addressing 
ransomware. The definition of a suitable target is satisfied after a person or device 
connects or interacts with the Internet (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 
2016). The only viable strategy in a suitable target perspective is to avoid the online 
environment. Completely avoiding the online environment is not within the context of 
realistic expectations for small businesses with a reliance on the Internet infrastructure. 
Blaming the victim is unfavorable due to the possibility of double victimization. 
Researchers consider victim behavior in probabilistic terms when combining routine 
activity theory and lifestyle theory (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). Risky behaviors place 
suitable targets on the Internet at an increased risk of victimization (Holtfreter et al., 
2015). Researchers consider and evaluate demographics of suitable targets to determine 
online victimization risk (Blasdell, 2015). In routine activity theory, it is possible to 
remove the potential of double victimization with victim blaming because acknowledging 
victim behavior is not a requirement. 
Regardless of behavior or demographic variables, successfully deceived targets 
become victims. One component of the fraud triangle is opportunity (Omidi et al., 2017; 
Reinstein & Taylor, 2017; Roden et al., 2016; Rodgers et al., 2015). Deception creates 
opportunity for criminal actors and is a precursor to fraud (Agustina, 2015). Suitable 
targets deceived into clicking an infected link or opening an infected attachment from a 
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phishing scam become victims; however, without access to criminal actors, it is difficult 
to investigate the remaining components of the fraud triangle. 
Adequate guardianship or the lack thereof remains as the final construct in routine 
activity theory in the cyberrealm. Adequate guardianship as a construct within the 
cyberrealm defines adequate protection in the form of security hardware, protection 
software, or end-user knowledge (Holtfreter et al., 2015). A lack of adequate protection 
and a lack of training and education for end users is a likely candidate for addressing 
ransomware with capable guardianship from the perspective of small business leaders. 
The gap in existing literature on adequate or capable guardianship, small business, and 
ransomware is apparent. 
Summary 
The routine activity theory may help small business leaders to develop effective 
strategies to address ransomware. Examples in the literature contain evidence of a lack of 
end-user training, failure of adequate guardianship, and an increase in target suitability. 
Overcoming the challenges of preventing a ransomware infection and minimizing 
damage from ransomware is possible with the proper strategy. End-user training to 
address ransomware is a potential strategy to strengthen adequate guardianship and 
reducing target suitability. Routine activity theory contains constructs to investigate 
effective strategies small business leaders’ use to address ransomware. 
Transition 
In Section 1, I supplied an account of the proposed study, the background of the 
problem, and a review of the literature associated with the research question. I outlined 
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the need for small business leaders to stay informed and knowledgeable to counter the 
escalating and evolving cybersecurity threat of ransomware to small business information 
systems and supporting technologies. I indicated how I investigated how small business 
leaders effectively address ransomware and if small business leader strategy aligns with 
the routine activity theory construct of adequate guardianship. I attempted to frame the 
research question within the conceptual framework and explored possible rival 
explanations. 
In Section 2, I outline the role of the researcher and justify my research decisions. 
As an example, I provide the rationale for inclusion criteria for participation. I then 
include the methodology of my research design prior to the collection of data. I explain 
how I conduct a multiple-case study to include leaders from multiple small businesses. I 
also discuss and provide the rationale for ethical research considerations, data 
organization and analysis, collection techniques, and the way I achieved trustworthiness 
with dependability, credibility, confirmability, and transferability. 
In Section 3, I present my findings, explain the application to professional 
practice, and offer recommendations. I use my predictions to compare against observed 
themes and cross-case analysis. The discussion in Section 3 includes the applicability of 
findings to routine activity theory. I include suggestions for positive social change, 
application to small business practice, and recommendations for future research. Finally, 
I provide a summary and reflection regarding effective strategies small business leaders 
use to address ransomware. 
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Section 2: The Project 
In Section 2, I focus on how I intend to construct a high-quality qualitative case 
study. I discuss my role as a researcher, the participants, and the research method and 
design. Section 2 includes ethical research considerations and the methods of data 
collection, organization, and analysis. This section includes an explanation of how I 
ensured the reliability and validity of my study. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the 
cybersecurity strategies some small business leaders use to protect their information 
systems from ransomware. The targeted population included five small business leaders 
located in the Knox County region of Tennessee who have successfully implemented 
cybersecurity strategies to protect their information systems from ransomware. The 
study’s implications for positive social change includes the potential for increasing 
employment opportunities in the region and supporting the local economy by protecting 
information systems from ransomware. Furthermore, small business leaders may realize 
the value of their business as a cybercrime target and consider implementing stronger 
cybersecurity controls to prevent and mitigate the spread of ransomware to protect 
confidential and sensitive consumer information. 
Role of the Researcher 
I served as the primary data collection instrument to provide the depth of inquiry 
possible in postmodern qualitative case study research. Qualitative inquiry allows 
researchers to stand in opposition to the scientifically based research movement and go 
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beyond institutionalized truths (Denzin, 2016). In qualitative case study research, the 
researcher’s responsibility is to collect data from multiple sources to form convergent 
lines of inquiry through interviews, evidence chains, informant review, and existing 
records (Yin, 2018). I performed this qualitative case study research of ransomware and 
small business using skills gained through academia and working in the technology field 
since 1993. I have experience as a small business owner, employee, and contractor for 
local business, have worked with more than 20 Fortune 500 companies, local 
government, and the U.S. Department of Defense during my time working in the 
technology field. I did not include participants from former or current business clientele. 
As the primary data collection instrument, I also took into consideration ethical concerns 
applicable to my study. 
I adhered to principles contained in the Belmont Report to ensure I maintained 
acceptable research ethics when working with human subjects. Internal criticisms of 
ethical models designed from the Belmont Report to promote principles of respect, 
beneficence, and justice in research involving human subjects indicate the common law 
as most beneficial to biomedical research and discourages artificially risky qualitative 
research (Denzin, 2016). Researchers use the principals identified in the Belmont Report 
to undertake ethical research and protect study participants (Goss, 2017; Miracle, 2016; 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, 1979). I did not consider my research inherently risky, nor receive 
any direct benefit, and I obtained informed consent and followed the Belmont Report 
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protocol to ensure the highest ethical standards of protecting the respect, beneficence, and 
justice of participants of my study. 
A risk for personal bias exists based on my extensive background in information 
technology and small business, as I may have had a preconceived idea of what small 
business leaders should be doing to address ransomware in their organization. My 
personal bias required keeping an open mind and maintaining personal diligence to avoid 
misinterpreting data from a personally biased position. Identifying researcher bias 
preserves transparency in qualitative research (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2018). 
Using multiple sources of data reduces selectivity bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; 
Snow, Richards, & Kinner, 2017; Yin, 2018). Bracketing, member checking, and 
bounding the case also reduces bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Morse, 2015; Pacho, 
2014; Yin, 2018). A successful member checking strategy includes asking for 
clarification and comparative meaning from previous interviews with the current 
participant (Yin, 2018). I bracketed my research, used multiple data sources, bound my 
case study, and distanced mental conclusions during data collection to mitigate bias and 
to purposefully view the data through the conceptual framework of routine activity 
theory. I followed an interview protocol (see Appendix). Researchers routinely follow a 
strict interview protocol to maintain quality in qualitative case study research (Baškarada, 
2014; Noble & Smith, 2015; Yin, 2018). I followed a strict interview protocol, obtained 
consent, performed member checking, and accomplished data saturation during data 




I established eligibility criteria for the participation of small business leaders on 
those who have successfully implemented cybersecurity strategies to protect their 
information systems from ransomware to answer my research question. The U.S. Census 
Bureau (2018) defines businesses with fewer than 500 full-time employees as a small 
business. The U.S. Small Business Administration in combination with U.S. Census 
Bureau data classifies over 97% of all businesses in the United States as small businesses 
(Congressional Research Service, 2018). The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018) 
defines a small business as one with fewer than 20 employees and independently owned 
and operated. I used the Australian Bureau of Statistics criteria to narrow the U.S. Census 
Bureau definition of small business for participant eligibility to independent owners of 
small businesses with fewer than 20 employees located in the Knox County region of 
Tennessee who have successfully implemented cybersecurity strategies to protect their 
information systems from ransomware.  
I located potential candidates through the small business resource directory at the 
public library. I determined cursory access to the site, small business ownership, and the 
sine qua non of technology in use at the businesses. Researchers in business and 
management with flexible research techniques can overcome the challenges inherent with 
securing access to participants (Lord, Bolton, Fleming, & Anderson, 2016). Researchers 
use cold calling, e-mail, and letters and share potential benefits of the study to secure 
access (Fjellström & Guttormsen, 2016). I solicited participation from publicly available 
sources and explained the purpose of my study with phone calls, via e-mail, or in person 
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with a courtesy introduction via e-mail or letter, and then met with the potential 
participants at a time of their choosing. 
I established a working relationship with each participant by introducing myself 
to the business owner, explaining my research study, and describing the data collection 
process. Relationships between researcher and participant are social and vary based on 
each participant (Yin, 2016). I explained the potential benefit of my research to small 
business leader participants. Clear communication of necessary agreements facilitates a 
healthy working relationship and strengthens data collection efforts (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2014). After a formal acknowledgment of interest in participating in the study, I 
confirmed eligibility, collected informed consent, and let the participant choose a 
physical venue or telephone option at a mutually convenient date and time. Interviewers 
must maintain a flexible schedule and be willing to meet at participants’ chosen place and 
time (Yin, 2014). In the event that the scheduled time or place was not convenient for me, 
I adjusted my schedule to accommodate the needs of the participant. 
Research Method and Design 
I chose a qualitative method after considering quantitative and mixed methods. I 
selected a multiple case study design within the qualitative method to study effective 
small business leader strategy for addressing ransomware. The context for my research 
was multiple small businesses and the unit of analysis was the leader of the respective 
small businesses. The multiple case study design provided a research design appropriate 
for interviewing multiple small business owners who have an effective strategy for 




I use a qualitative research method for this study. Qualitative research is the study 
of a social phenomenon, in context, to gain a rich understanding from participants 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Holistic, complex, or interpretive research occurring in the 
natural world is characteristic of the qualitative method (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). 
Alternatives to the qualitative method include quantitative and mixed-methods. In 
quantitative research, the researcher collects data in the form of numbers and statistics 
and tests a hypothesis (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). I was not testing a hypothesis; 
rather, I was exploring what effective strategies small business leaders use and how they 
overcame related challenges in addressing ransomware. 
I did not use the quantitative method, as I did not intend to test a hypothesis. 
Researchers use mixed-methods design to combine qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies and to test variables (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). A mixed-methods 
approach was inappropriate because I did not intend to collect numbers or statistical data 
and test a hypothesis in combination with qualitative data to explore the research question 
and perform variable comparisons. 
I used the qualitative method to explore context in the natural world to answer a 
research question. The vehicle for this exploration was semistructured interviews, which 
facilitate an in-depth exploration of the topic. Researchers who conduct semistructured 
interviews go beyond the quantitative resemblance of structured interviewing to 
overcome the lack of clear direction with unstructured interviewing techniques (Wilson, 
2016). Qualitative interviewing techniques allow researchers to obtain rich data from 
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participants not otherwise available with other methods (Lancaster, 2017; McVey, Lees, 
& Nolan, 2016). Qualitative methods aligned with my objective to gain a rich 
understanding of what strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware and 
provide access to data otherwise unavailable with other methods. 
Research Design 
I chose a qualitative multiple case study research design after considering case 
study, phenomenology, and narrative research designs. A qualitative case study research 
design is appropriate for a deep exploration of a phenomenon in a business context 
(Achtenhagen, Brunninge, & Melin, 2017; Arasti, Khaleghi, & Noori, 2017; Jarvis & 
Williams, 2017). Researchers use case study research for flexibility in forming a holistic 
perspective of what is shared and unique about the case (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 
2014). Researchers use cross-case analysis to explore individual cases holistically within 
multiple contexts as a way to create a replicable study (Yin, 2018). A case study design is 
appropriate when the researcher intends to understand the viewpoint of participants 
(Baškarada, 2014). I used interview questions aligned with my research question to 
explore the sophisticated phenomenon of effective strategies small business leaders use to 
address ransomware. 
In phenomenology research, researchers attempt to understand cognition and 
expectations (Fawcett, Fawcett, Cooper, & Daynes, 2014). I was not attempting to 
explore expectations of participants; therefore, the phenomenology research design was 
inappropriate. Researchers use narrative research to explore the experience of unique 
populations (McCann & Brown, 2017). I was not seeking to explore the experience of 
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small business leaders, but rather, their strategies to address ransomware in their small 
business. 
Researchers have used case study research to indicate the importance of 
leadership skills in the business sector (Creţu & Iova, 2015). Data gathered from 
interviews with small business leaders in this multiple case study research may indicate 
effective strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. Researchers have 
also used a qualitative case study research design for investigating ransomware (Ali, 
2017; Pascariu, Barbu, & Bacivarov, 2017; Patyal, Sampalli, Qiang, & Rahman, 2017). I 
conducted semistructured interviews to gain a rich understanding of the phenomenon in a 
bounded replication multiple case study design. Design replication in case study research 
occurs during the purposeful selection of cases to include during the design stage (Yin, 
2018). I facilitated replication by limiting case selection to the small business sector. 
Data saturation in qualitative case study research design indicates quality and 
rigor. Data, themes, coding, and replication are universal elements in defining data 
saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Data saturation occurs once shared commonalities 
among interview participants cease (Constantinou, Georgiou, & Perdikogianni, 2017) and 
when no gain of new information is possible (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Marshall & Rossman, 
2016; Yin, 2018). I analyzed data collected from interview responses and company 
documents, identified all possible themes, and remained open to expanding my 
participant pool if needed until I achieved data saturation. 
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Population and Sampling 
The population for this study consisted of five independent small business owners 
with fewer than 20 employees located in the Knox County region of East Tennessee who 
use information systems in their organization and have applied strategies to avoid 
ransomware. I was interested in achieving a depth of understanding only possible with a 
small number of participants. In-depth qualitative research with information-rich 
participants justifies a small number of informants (Boddy, 2016; Malterud, Siersma, & 
Guassora, 2016; Van Rijnsoever, 2017). A purposive sampling method supports selection 
criteria based on the data collection strategy (Roy, Zvonkovic, Goldberg, Sharp, & 
LaRossa, 2015). A maximal information strategy is appropriate for purposive sampling 
when researchers are highly familiar with the field and population (Van Rijnsoever, 
2017). Purposive sampling is appropriate when using selection criteria to target a specific 
population (Asiamah, Mensah, & Oteng-Abayie, 2017; Roy, & Basu, 2015). Establishing 
trust and using a gatekeeper to coordinate the researcher with a participant is effective in 
overcoming the challenges inherent with interviewing difficult-to-reach populations 
(Kasim & Al-Gahuri, 2015). I used purposive sampling to choose independent small 
business owners within the Knox County region of East Tennessee who use information 
systems in their businesses. 
I achieved data saturation through member checking and triangulation with 
purposive sampling, maximal information, and bounded case design. Data saturation is 
possible with only a single informant within in-depth qualitative research (Boddy, 2016). 
Data saturation is unique to each study, dictated by study design, and possible once no 
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new themes or explanations for data exist (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Miles et al., 2014; 
Morse, 2015). I conducted interviews with a minimum of five participants to achieve data 
saturation. 
Ethical Research 
I maintained and adhered to ethical standards required by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Walden University. Approval by the IRB is essential in scholarly 
qualitative research, and researchers should disclose values or conflicts of interest 
(Denzin, 2016). I followed all requirements of IRB and disclosed values and conflict of 
interest to ensure compliance with ethical research. Ethical research considerations exist 
at the outset, during, and after the conclusion of research (Drake, 2014). The Walden 
University IRB approval number for this study is 05-02-19-0612293. I received consent 
from participants, provided participant withdrawal procedures, and took necessary 
precautions to protect participants and data before, during, and after the completion of the 
study. 
Informed consent is part of a process to allow participants to understand a study 
before deciding whether to take part. Participants received adequate time to review, 
understand, and sign an emailed, mailed, or hand delivered informed consent letter prior 
to inclusion in the study. Informed consent protects the participant, researcher, and 
institution from potential harm arising from participation in research (Byerley et al., 
2017; Petrovic, 2017). Complex certificates of confidentiality lower participant trust, 
while simple and accurate language increases trust and participation (Beskow, Check, & 
Ammarell, 2014). A significant risk in research is that participants will not dedicate 
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enough time to reading consent forms to ensure proper understanding and instead will 
perform only a cursory read before signing (Knepp, 2014). An IRB may work with 
researchers to customize consent form language appropriate to a study (Check, Wolf, 
Dame, & Beskow, 2014). I ensured participants were aware of what they were consenting 
to and that consent was for the entire scope and duration of the study. 
Participants could withdraw from the study at any time. I allowed participants to 
make their request to withdraw from the study at any time before or during the study by 
phone call, by text message, in person, or by e-mail. An informed consent form 
containing clear instructions of what happens if a participant withdraws supports a 
researcher’s action and decision to use partial data (Thorpe, 2014). Participants did not 
suffer any penalties for withdrawing at any time before or during the study, and I 
discarded any research from participants who withdrew from the study. 
I used pseudonyms with the naming convention of P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5 to 
protect the identity of participants and stored all research data on an encrypted and 
password-protected USB storage device. I outlined my responsibilities in protecting the 
collected research data while seeking informed consent. The researcher’s responsibility is 
to avoid divulging demographics or other identifying characteristics that may violate 
participant confidentiality (Morse & Coulehan, 2015). I did not consider demographic 
constructs and did not disclose demographic markers of participants beyond the general 
region of the location of the study. Data stored on encrypted and password-protected 
USB storage will be stored for 5 years in a biometric safe located in my home office. I 
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use pseudonyms and will destroy all research data after 5 years to protect participant 
confidentiality. 
Data Collection Instruments 
I was the data collection instrument for the study. I conducted semistructured 
interviews, examined company documents, followed an interview protocol (see 
Appendix), and performed member checking. I used open-ended semistructured 
interviews to gather data on effective strategies to address ransomware in small business. 
Interviews are one way to gather a large amount of data from participants on problems 
that are technical in nature (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Some researchers use an 
interview protocol to conduct semistructured interviews (Cohen & Kassan, 2018; Mao & 
Bottorff, 2017; Sollie, Kop, & Euwema, 2017). In a semistructured interview, the 
interviewer has the flexibility to prompt for additional information as interesting 
information emerges from questions contained in the interview protocol (Baškarada, 
2014). Member checking enhances the interview protocol to determine if what the 
interviewer understands and what the participant means is correct (Yin, 2018). I 
attempted to enhance the reliability and validity of the study using an interview protocol 
and member checking process. Member checking occurs during the initial interview and 
after data analysis is complete (Yin, 2018). I conducted interviews and performed 
immediate member checking during the initial interview with the participant and 




I requested copies of company documents showing the types of information 
systems in use at the small business, information security training programs, and 
information security software and hardware. Company documents contain contextual 
information used for validating and triangulating data (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). 
Company documents for this case included purchase receipts, training documentation, 
and an inventory of operating systems, security software, and security devices. Security 
in the form of antivirus software might contain provisions to prevent a ransomware 
infection (Patyal et al., 2017). Beyond antivirus software, end-user behavior also has a 
significant role in preventing ransomware infection (Ali, 2017). Documents that might 
reveal company choice of operating systems, antivirus software, and training that affects 
end user behavior are important to understanding effective strategies used to address 
ransomware. I collected documents necessary to form a holistic view of the state of the 
information systems in use at the companies and to corroborate interview findings. 
Data Collection Technique 
I explored effective strategies to address ransomware by conducting interviews, 
reviewing archival records, and gathering company documents. A sense of trust between 
the interviewee and the interviewer, facilitated when the interviewer receives a referral to 
the interviewee from someone else, improves the sharing of data in semistructured 
interviews (Nguyen, 2015). To achieve an intimate understanding of a phenomenon and 
to capture interviewees’ viewpoint requires a balance of neutral and embodied inquiry 
(Alby & Fatigante, 2014). In a semistructured interview, the interviewer can expand the 
inquiry as information emerges to develop a better understanding of the interviewees’ 
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viewpoint (Baškarada, 2014). Disadvantages of using interviews as a data collection 
technique include the possibility of misunderstanding interviewees’ responses and the 
influence of bias from interviewer or interviewee in interpreting responses or providing 
responses to interview questions (Baškarada, 2014). However, I mitigated these 
disadvantages by identifying my biases, verifying interviewee responses, and conducting 
as many follow-up member checking sessions as necessary to ensure I captured the 
interviewees’ viewpoint. 
I conducted member checking to enhance the reliability and validity of data 
collection. Member checking occurs when the researcher builds trust in the results by 
reviewing analyzed interview data from a participant interview with the participant to 
verify, modify, and confirm the analysis (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, & Walter, 2016). 
Member checking can increase the rigor of information systems research involving 
participants and in deriving if participant meanings from interview questions align with 
researcher interpretations (Iivari, 2018). A researcher can confirm and validate with 
member checking by providing a summary of the interview to the interviewee (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2016). I engaged in member checking during and after each interview with 
the participant to increase my depth of understanding of participant meaning to the 
interview question responses. 
I digitally recorded the interviews. Researchers can digitally record interviews 
and transcribe interviews verbatim (Fernandez, Sheppard-Law, Curtis, Bancroft, & 
Smith, 2018; Kohn, Belza, Petrescu-Prahova, & Miyawaki, 2016; Porteous & Machin, 
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2018). After digitally recording the interview, I transferred the digital recording to a 
computer with an encrypted hard drive and transcribed the interview verbatim. 
I kept a reflective journal during the study. Researchers can use reflective 
journaling during the data collection phase of research to increase awareness and improve 
research quality (Digby, Lee, & Williams, 2016; Perlman et al., 2018; Zulfikar & 
Mujibur, 2018). I used a composition book to handwrite reflective journal entries during 
and after the interview. I digitized my reflective journal and stored it with the transcribed 
interview on an encrypted hard drive. 
I requested company documents and archival records. Researchers can use 
semistructured interviews and company documents to corroborate and triangulate data 
(Jussani, Wright, & Ibusuki, 2017; Kaminska & Borzillo, 2017; Ye & Lau, 2018). One 
disadvantage to archival records is they can be challenging to search and may be 
incomplete (Jones & O’Neill, 2014). However, diligently searching through data from 
archival research can lead to new meaning and hidden truths (Norquay, 2017). I 
requested copies of company documents and archival records showing the types of 
information systems in use at the small business, information security training programs, 
and information security software and hardware. 
Data Organization Technique 
I used a purposeful and methodical approach to organize my data. I temporarily 
stored all collected data on an encrypted hard drive in a research folder with separate 
codified folders for each participant. I maintained a backup copy of the research folder on 
an encrypted and password-protected USB drive. I used a digital recorder to record the 
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interviews and then transfer the recordings to a computer with a password protected and 
encrypted hard drive. I transcribed the interviews into a Microsoft Word document for 
data analysis and to back up the original audio files; I transcribed my reflective journal 
into multiple Word documents and stored the file inside the respective coded participant 
folder. Next, I organized and digitally stored the company documents that I collected 
inside the coded participant folder. I used Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, QSR 
NVivo, and Microsoft Azure SQL to organize the collected data for further analysis. 
Researchers have used QSR NVivo, spreadsheets, and databases to collect, store, codify, 
and analyze research data (Cook, LaVan, & Zilic, 2018; Hunt & Bakker, 2018; Woods, 
Paulus, Atkins, & Macklin, 2016). After I completed the data analysis, I made a final 
backup of the contents of the research folder onto two encrypted and password-protected 
USB drives. I stored the USB drives in a biometric-protected safe, to which only I had 
access, in my home office for at least 5 years. I will have erased the contents of the USB 
drives after the mandatory 5-year retention period. 
Data Analysis 
I followed a reiterative process of analyzing collected data. Qualitative 
researchers can analyze data using a reiterative process of reviewing data, organizing 
data, coding data, and developing themes (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2014, 2018). Yin 
(2016) noted a five-cycle approach to this reiterative process would include (a) 
compiling, (b) disassembling, (c) reassembling, (d) interpreting, and (e) concluding. I 
used these reiterative approaches to guide my data analysis process decisions. 
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The process of reviewing and compiling data included source material from 
interview transcripts, member checking, reflective journal entries, and company 
documents. I carefully organized my data into a meaningful database to prepare the initial 
codification, disassembling, and reassembling. I used methodological triangulation to 
perform my data analysis. Case study triangulation consists of methodological, 
investigator, theory, and data source triangulation (Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, 
Blythe, & Neville, 2014; Renz, Carrington, & Badger, 2018). Triangulation involves 
converging multiple sources of data (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Data in 
methodological triangulation can come from sources such as interviews and company 
documents (Abdalla, Oliveira, Azevedo, & Gonzalez, 2018), and a researcher can use 
these data sources to provide a rich understanding of the studied phenomenon (Varpio, 
Ajjawi, Monrouxe, O’Brien, & Rees, 2017). I performed data analysis to identify themes 
using methodological triangulation with interviews and company documents, which 
included information system specifications and training documents. 
I engaged in an iterative and methodological process of analyzing collected data 
from each case. I analyzed the collected data using different techniques. One technique of 
case study data analysis is using pattern matching logic (Yin, 2018). I codified the data 
and looked for patterns. Another technique is cross-case synthesis, where the researcher 
compares case conclusions to answer the research question (Yin, 2018). I went beyond 
treating each case as an independent topic and explored the combined cases from a 




Researchers can use computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software to 
iteratively explore their data and identify patterns (Yin, 2018). I used QSR International 
(QSR) NVivo to assist in identifying patterns and analyzing the data. Cook et al. (2018) 
used QSR NVivo to analyze almost 10 million words from reports using categories 
developed from a conceptual framework. Hunt and Bakker (2018) performed a similar 
analysis using audio-recorded data and QSR NVivo. Woods et al. (2016) reported most 
researchers from 763 empirical studies used NVivo for data management and analysis. I 
repeated the process of disassembling and reassembling until substantive themes 
emerged. I interpreted the data against the literature, conceptual framework, and rival 
explanations to conclude and report my research findings. 
I initially based my interpretation on themes identified in the literature review. 
The themes included (a) adequate guardianship, (b) suitable targets and VIVA constructs, 
(c) motivated offenders, (d) within framework rivalry, (e) victim behavior rival, and (f) 
fraud triangle deception rival. Adhering to the themes identified in the literature review 
allowed for a thorough examination using the conceptual framework and a comparison 
against rival explanations. 
Reliability and Validity 
A qualitative case study research approach using routine activity theory goes 
beyond quantitative hypothesis testing. Reliability and validity are predominant in 
quantitative research (Cypress, 2017); however, creating and following a strict case study 
protocol in qualitative research achieves the same rigor (Denzin, 2016; Yin, 2018). 
Qualitative methods are beneficial in cybersecurity strategy research (Štitilis et al., 2017). 
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Following a case study protocol supports theory development through a rich 
understanding of the case study (Baškarada, 2014). I followed a qualitative case study 
protocol to develop a rich understanding of the phenomenon. 
Reliability 
Researchers interpret reliability through a qualitative lens to determine 
dependability. The dependability of a study is the extent to which the study is repeatable 
with similar results (Grossoehme, 2014; Yin, 2018). Following a strict case study 
protocol increases repeatability (Noble & Smith, 2015; Yin, 2018). Member checking, 
data interpretation, bracketing, and methodological triangulation increases the 
dependability and replicability of case study research (Morse, 2015; Pacho, 2014; Yin, 
2018). I followed a strict case study protocol, used bracketing, included multiple sources 
of data for methodological triangulation, and conducted member checking to achieve 
study dependability and replicability. 
Validity 
Quality in qualitative case study research consists of identifiable factors. Critical 
factors of quality in qualitative case study research include credibility, transferability, 
confirmability, and data saturation (Yin, 2018). The critical factors of quality as applied 
to this study are discussed below. 
Validate. Validation is a critical factor of quality. Validating participant 
responses with member checking is one method to establish credibility (Cope, 2014; 
Noble & Smith, 2015; Taylor & Thomas-Gregory, 2015). Qualitative credibility also 
involves identifying bias and keeping detailed research logs (Noble & Smith, 2015; 
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Taylor & Thomas-Gregory, 2015). I validated participant responses with member 
checking, identified my biases, and maintained a research log to ensure credibility. 
Transfer. Transferability is another critical factor of quality. Transferability is a 
decision best made by other researchers based on the robustness of the research and is 
dependent upon providing sufficient detail on the development of themes, participant 
selection, and context of the case study (Cope, 2014; Elo et al., 2014; Smith & Noble, 
2014; Taylor & Thomas-Gregory, 2015). I provided a rich description of thematic 
development, described how I chose participants, and provided a clear distinction 
between case and context of the study to improve transferability. 
Confirm. The next critical factor of quality is confirmation. Confirmability exists 
when external examination corroborates distinct research conclusions beyond the 
culmination of data gathered from participants (Cope, 2014; Elo et al., 2014; Noble & 
Smith, 2015). I did not treat each case as a single data set but rather as a composite to 
identify complex themes and phenomena to aid in confirming research conclusions. 
Saturate. An additional critical factor of quality is saturation. Data saturation 
occurs once no new information is observed (Boddy, 2016; Cleary, Horsfall, & Hayter, 
2014; Cronin, 2014; Fusch & Ness, 2015; Gross, Blue-Banning, Turnbull, & Francis, 
2015; Smith & Noble, 2014). I conducted member checking during and after the 
interview process, kept detailed research logs, identified researcher bias, detailed the 
codification process, engaged in purposive participant selection, differentiated findings 
from participant-provided information, and used replication logic until data saturation to 
establish quality and rigor. 
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Transition and Summary 
In Section 2, I restated the purpose statement, outlined the role of the researcher, 
and described participants. Participants included small business owners in the Knox 
County region of Tennessee. I continued in Section 2 with identifying the research 
method, research design, population and sampling, and information about ethical 
research. I described how I conducted my research according to ethical standards as set 
forth by the Walden IRB. I also discussed my role as the data collection instrument, as 
well as the data collection technique, data organization, data analysis, and the way I 
addressed reliability and validity. Further, I discussed how I used methodological 
triangulation to perform data analysis and support research rigor. 
In Section 3, I present my findings and provide recommendations for possible 
future research. I continue in Section 3 by comparing my predictions with observed 
themes and rival explanations. Section 3 also includes a discussion of the benefits to 
business practice and society. After sharing my recommendations possible future 
research, I provide my reflections of the research process and my concluding thoughts. 
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
 In Section 2, I addressed the bias in my data collection, participant selection, the 
research method and design, ethical considerations, and data collection technique. In 
Section 3, I present the findings from data collection, discuss the application to 
professional practice, social change implications, and provide recommendations for 
action and further research. I close with my reflections on the doctoral journey and 
conclusion of the research. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the 
cybersecurity strategies some small business leaders use to protect their information 
systems from ransomware. Findings from this study may aid small business leaders in 
developing effective strategies to address ransomware. The findings came from data I 
collected by interviewing five small business leaders located in the southeast region of 
the United States, from reviewing company documents, and from examining peer-
reviewed literature. In the following sections, I explore themes developed from the data. I 
identified three emergent themes from the interviews and document review. The 
emergent themes were (a) ransomware strategy, (b) support structure, and (c) 
cybersecurity awareness. The findings support the conclusions and answer the research 
question about effective strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. 
Presentation of the Findings 
The research question for this study was as follows: What cybersecurity strategies 
do some small business leaders use to protect their information systems from 
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ransomware? After data analysis I found three emergent themes. The three emergent 
themes were (a) ransomware strategy, (b) support structure, and (c) cybersecurity 
awareness. The emergent themes from participant comments appear in Table 1 with 
percentage of contribution to emergent theme. 
Table 1 








Theme 1: Ransomware strategy 5 100 
Theme 2: Support structure 5 100 
Theme 3: Cybersecurity awareness 5 100 
 
 All five participants contributed to each emergent theme. Themes were developed 
by comparing manually and auto-coded themes from QSR NVivo using data collected 
from interview transcripts, member checking, reflective journal entries, and company 
documents.  
Theme 1: Ransomware Strategy 
Each participant expressed “[using] antivirus” as a strategy for effectively 
addressing ransomware. Bergmann et al. (2018) identified protective factors to avoid 
becoming a victim of cybercrime include using antivirus software, keeping software 
updated, using strong passwords, verifying the safety of websites, and deleting suspicious 
emails. Participant P2 and participant P4 lacked confidence in older versions of antivirus 
and thought to upgrade to the latest versions of software as just as important for 
effectively addressing ransomware. Participant P2 stated, “we use the [factory installed] 
virus protection.” Participant P4 stated, “we use [antivirus software] as our protection 
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[and recently] upgraded [to stay safe].” Participant P1, participant P3, and participant P5 
rely heavily on antivirus and the alerts presented on screen to gauge the effectiveness of 
their strategy to effectively address ransomware. Participant P1 stated, “we basically use 
an antivirus protection program and it sends out alerts.” Participant P3 was especially 
confident in the ability of antivirus to keep their systems safe from ransomware and 
stated “[antivirus] works very well and [alerts when the antivirus] cleans everything up.” 
Participant P5 stated, “usually they [the antivirus program] will give you a message or 
something will appear on your computer telling you that you need to double check or run 
a report.” Participant P2 and participant P4 gauged effectiveness by stating that their 
information systems had not yet been held for ransom as evidence of effectiveness. 
Participant P2 stated, “well, in a very simple manner that we’ve not been infected or not 
had to pay a ransom. That is probably the best answer I can give you. I have not been 
held ransom yet or had to send anybody a check.” Participant P4 stated, “I haven’t had 
any issues and I haven’t had any problems at all.” Three participants rely on alerts, while 
two participants gauge effectiveness based on not being held for ransom. The distribution 
of how participants gauge the effectiveness of their strategy to address ransomware using 
antivirus appear in Table 2 with percentage values. 
Table 2 





contribution to response 
Alerts 3 60 




Antivirus emerged as the dominant ransomware strategy small business leaders 
use to address ransomware. The majority of small business leaders stated their reliance on 
a feedback mechanism in the form of alerts, as a function of the antivirus software, to aid 
in gauging the effectiveness of using antivirus. Hampton et al. (2018) observed legacy 
cryptographic functions, abnormal file activity, abnormal internet connection attempts, 
the creation of start-up items, and obfuscated code execution attempts during ransomware 
infection analysis and determined detection was possible at the operating system level. 
Small business leaders use antivirus protection to mitigate risks, threats, and attacks at the 
operating system level to prevent a ransomware infection. 
Antivirus, as the dominant participant response, manifested as evidence for an 
effective strategy for mitigating the threat of ransomware and malware to small business 
information systems. It is possible that antivirus software is capable of providing 
protection even if a user unintentionally performs an adverse action that might 
inadvertently infect a previously uninfected information system. Risks, threats, and 
attacks from ransomware and malware are addressed using antivirus as protection. 
However, the current function of antivirus does not fully address data and network 
security concerns for these small business leaders. In compiling interview data, it was 
apparent other concerns surfaced. These concerns led to a sub-theme of securing data and 
the network. 
The sub-theme of securing data and the network emerged from the additional 
actions these small business leaders were performing to secure their systems from 
ransomware. Data security consisted of the small business leader securing their data and 
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the network from ransomware. Information security responsibility and threat targets 
included data stored on the computer and data traversing the network. The small business 
leaders used similar strategies to secure small business data and the network. 
The small business leaders were most concerned with protecting their local data, 
and the threat from ransomware was not singled out among any specific cybersecurity 
threat as more or less dangerous from the small business leader perspective. Participant 
P3 and participant P5 have a formal procedure in place for backing up their data 
regularly, and both use antivirus software with the capability of only allowing approved 
or known good applications to run or make changes to data. Thomas and Galligher 
(2018) suggested having data backups available for restoring company data to a date that 
would have preceded the occurrence of a ransomware infection. Thomas and Galligher 
also suggested, as an additional precaution, using data backups that are at least 14 to 21 
days older than the ransomware infection date to prevent an inadvertent reintroduction of 
ransomware. The most recent data backup might contain the malicious code responsible 
for infecting the information system with ransomware. In two instances, participant P3 
and participant P5 were using USB thumb drives to back up their data. The USB drives 
were also disconnected from the information system and stored in a safe place to protect 
from environmental threats such as fire or unauthorized access as an additional safety 
precaution. 
Threats to data traversing the network and general connectivity beyond the local 
information system are exterior to local storage of protected small business data. All 
participants were most concerned with protecting the local information system rather than 
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any data stored outside of their local information system. Participants assumed their 
antivirus software provided protection regardless of the threat vector or target. However, 
ransomware is not limited to infecting information systems used to support business 
processes but rather any system capable of storing data (Brody et al., 2018). The threat 
posed by ransomware has the potential to affect other systems that are not locally 
attached or directly used to support business processes and requires additional network 
protection to limit threat exposure. 
One method of protecting the network and limiting exposure is through the use of 
a firewall for devices connected over a network. In all instances, the participants were 
unaware of the function of the firewall. However, all participants were using a physical 
firewall integrated with their modem provided by their Internet service provider (ISP) or 
using a second physical firewall in conjunction with the firewall provided by their ISP as 
an added layer of security. Additionally, all participants had software-based firewalls 
enabled at the operating systems level and benefited from the network protections 
provided by their antivirus solution. 
Theme 2: Support Structure 
An additional theme discovered from the data analysis was the emergence of 
support structures to address ransomware. Ransomware victims experience four stages of 
an attack that includes infection, encryption, demand, and outcome (Hampton et al., 
2018). Pre-planning is required to prevent initial infection and subsequent encryption of 
protected data. The demand and eventual outcome would occur after the infection and 
encryption stage with the outcome need for post-incident support. All participants work 
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with either customer support or their peer-network for pre-planning or post-incident 
support. Participant P1 and participant P3 rely on vendor-supplied customer support for 
pre-planning and post-incident support. Participant P1 relies on support from the antivirus 
vendor noting, “we would probably contact the virus people; we don’t have a tech guy.” 
Participant P3 stated, “[they] would call for customer support.” Participant P2, participant 
P4, and participant P5 were more confident in reaching out through their peer-network to 
find support based on a peer recommendation either during pre-planning or post-incident. 
Participant P2 stated, 
Probably like many would, I would have to hire it out, I would have to get with 
one of our people that help us and assist us with all of that. I would just let them 
walk us through it or get us pointed in the right direction. 
Participant P4 stated, “I would reach out to one of my friends and say – hey this popped 
up what do I need to do?” Participant P5 stated, “[they] have a go to person and they can 
usually get some information from them.” All participants indicated that they relied upon 
support structures, as evident in the initial preparation phase against a potential threat 
such as ransomware and the strategy to recover post-incident. 
All five participants were prepared to address ransomware through their preferred 
method of support before and after a potential ransomware incident. Brody et al. (2018) 
suggested companies either outsource their information security or implement a dedicated 
information security department to manage cybersecurity and proactively prevent harm 
against the growing threat of malware. It may be challenging for some small business 
leaders to justify the expense of implementing a dedicated information security 
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department to address information security concerns. These small business leaders 
outsourced their information security needs, involved their peer network, or worked 
directly with a security provider. Implementing a dedicated department for information 
security was unnecessary for these small business leaders. 
Theme 3: Cybersecurity Awareness 
Cybersecurity awareness stems from a user-centric view of cybersecurity strategy, 
involving multiple pathways of learning and information gathering. Small business 
leaders are self-taught, reach out and ask questions from those in their peer network, and 
rely on antivirus vendors to provide educational information. Cybersecurity strategies 
that do not include user training fail to address behavioral-based errors that lead to 
successful ransomware attacks (Nobles, 2018). These self-taught small business leaders 
were knowledgeable in their strategies to address ransomware. The participants were 
comfortable reaching out to those in their peer network for guidance and education before 
an incident or in the event of an infection as a post-incident reactionary response. 
Participant P1, participant P3, and participant P5 take advantage of antivirus vendor 
supplied educational information. The vendor of participant P1 offered a service named 
“security awareness training” and sent out regular communication via email that 
reinforces knowledge of the threat of ransomware. Participant P3 and participant P5 have 
access to what was listed as “free cyber security training” from their chosen vendor and 
received monthly email newsletters that include the latest information and trends related 
to ransomware infection. Participant P2 and participant P4 thought that simplified 
instruction was best and expressed interest in learning more about cybersecurity. All 
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participants were aware of the threats posed by informal cyber activities such as reckless 
cyber behavior in opening emails from unknown senders, and visiting unfamiliar 
websites, and were inclined to follow advice from trusted sources rather than pursuing 
formal education in cybersecurity training. 
Participants understood the importance of using caution when operating their 
information systems and staying up to date. Participant P2 stated, “as simple as this 
sounds, we try to be careful of what files or [junk mail] that we open [through email]” 
and participant P5 stated, “[they] try to stay up to date with what is going on and that 
[they] receive regular updates and keep [their] computers updated as often as possible.” 
Participant P1 stated, “[they] stay informed [of the latest protection against ransomware] 
by reading [about the topic] and take [appropriate] action and uses the latest operating 
systems to stay up to date [with the latest trends].” Proactively using caution with 
opening files and keeping information systems software updated provided these small 
business leaders with one strategy to effectively address ransomware. An instinctive 
approach appeared to be effective; however, a proactive approach based on cybersecurity 
awareness of staying informed and up to date and end-user education was also evident. 
Participant P2 and participant P4 used their knowledge to effectively address 
ransomware. Participant P2 stated, “shoots from the hip” as one way to describe how they 
respond to threats such as ransomware. Participant P4 lacked confidence in knowledge 
and understanding of outdated software to protect their information systems from 
ransomware. Participant P4 reacted by switching to a perceived more secure platform to 
conduct daily business while limiting use on the system viewed as more vulnerable to 
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threats. Participant P4 stated, “I don’t do as much work on the [older system] anymore as 
I used to, I have got a [newer system] and use it because I think it is safer and use it 
more.” Cybersecurity awareness culminates in a user-centric view of small business 
leader strategy in responding to the threat posed to their information systems from 
ransomware. 
Findings Related to Routine Activity Theory 
Findings from the data analysis revealed adherence to routine activity theory as all 
participants were adamant on using antivirus as part of their ransomware strategy for 
effectively addressing ransomware. Antivirus as a ransomware strategy indicates 
participants use antivirus as a tool to provide adequate protection or guardianship over 
their information systems. A lack of adequate protection or guardianship allows a 
ransomware offender to compromise the target information system. While antivirus may 
provide adequate protection or guardianship over the target information system other 
factors such as support structure and cybersecurity awareness also influence adequate 
guardianship. 
All participants used, “antivirus” as a ransomware strategy, had support structures 
in place ranging from formal to informal, and had a user-centric view of cybersecurity. 
Based on the findings from the small business leaders, it was possible to protect small 
business information systems against ransomware with effective strategies and support 
structures. I selected routine activity as the conceptual framework for my study. 
Referencing Jansen and Leukfeldt’s (2016) recommendation, I focused on guardianship 
as a way to explain effective strategies to address a single threat of ransomware to small 
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business information systems. Bergmann et al. (2018) used a routine activity approach 
and recommended studying cybercrime offenses separately to gain a rich understanding 
of how potential victim risk factors and protective strategies influence outcomes. 
Through the lens of effective guardianship, the role of antivirus in ransomware strategy 
was significant with unanimous agreement between participant responses. The 
connection between the emergent themes and routine activity theory construct 
guardianship was apparent. 
Other factors discovered during data collection may influence the effectiveness of 
an aspect of the conceptual framework, adequate guardianship. These other factors as 
identified during the data collection process as emergent themes included (a) ransomware 
strategy, (b) support structure, and (c) cybersecurity awareness. A lack of adequate 
guardianship may result in victimization and reinforces the need for protection in the 
cyber realm (Choi, Cho, & Lee, 2019; Choi, Earl, Lee, & Cho, 2019; Vakhitova, Alston-
Knox, Reynald, Townsley, & Webster, 2019). Proactive protection may support adequate 
guardianship, while, reactive protection in the form of a support structure and 
rudimentary knowledge and understanding may also contribute to adequate guardianship. 
Combining proactive and reactive security measures is effective in combating cybercrime 
(Donegan, 2019; Ogunlana, 2019). Having an adequate support arrangement with either a 
peer network or vendor-supplied support prior to a ransomware attack may support 
adequate guardianship. Cybersecurity awareness includes educating oneself against the 
threat of ransomware and how best to protect target information systems from infection. 
While Whitty (2019) indicated the act of being cautious because of an awareness of a 
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cybersecurity threat is not enough to prevent victimization, Williams, Levi, Burnap, and 
Gundur, (2019) found repeated exposure to information on how to protect oneself online 
decreased victimization risk. Cybersecurity awareness supports adequate guardianship. 
Data and network security includes maintaining adequate backups and protecting the 
network (Thomas & Galligher, 2018). Data and network security supports adequate 
guardianship, while, failing to properly keep adequate backups of data or securing the 
network with firewalls contribute to a lack of adequate guardianship. These contributing 
factors were evidence of the strategic value the respondents placed on their joint 
application to achieve guardianship to prevent a compromised target by ransomware. 
Guardianship emerged as a critical factor in technology and routine activity 
theory studies in preventing victimization. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) and Ilievski 
(2016) both discussed the importance of guardianship as technological protection such as 
antivirus in their research involving routine activity theory. Routine activity theory 
provides constructs of guardianship, motivated offender, and victim. The emergent 
themes from this study aligned with guardianship. Figure 2 depicts specific routine 
activity theory studies from the literature review. The intersecting studies in Figure 2 




Figure 2. Intersection of cyber and guardian in routine activity studies. 
Figure 2 depicts the studies, highlighted in white, discussed in the literature 
review, that contain the routine activity theory conceptual construct guardianship within 
the context of the cyber realm. This study on effective strategies small business leaders 
used to address ransomware might fit within the same categorization of the studies 
highlighted in white. Categorization justification is based on findings linking cyber 
guardianship and the emergent themes. Ransomware strategy, support structure, and 
cybersecurity awareness fit within the context of routine activity theory guardianship. 
Findings from this study echo the importance of the guardianship conceptual construct of 




Application to Professional Practice 
The findings of this study are relevant to improve strategies small business leaders 
use to address ransomware before victimization occurs. Small business leaders can use 
the results from this study to confirm if implemented strategies in their organization fall 
short, match, or exceed what other leaders of small businesses are doing in their 
organizations to address security against ransomware. Organizations whose leaders fail to 
measure and address their internal cybersecurity posture create an opportunity for 
victimization to occur (Williams et al., 2019). The growing threat of ransomware to small 
business information systems is capable of denying access to information system 
resources required for daily business operations and specific strategies exist to mitigate 
the threat. 
Small business leaders can adapt their strategies to address ransomware by 
examining their management approach of data and the network, support structure, and 
cybersecurity awareness. Reducing the likelihood of victimization requires going beyond 
the act of examining cybersecurity strategies with implementation (Whitty, 2019). Based 
on the findings of the study, small business leaders may consider evaluating how they are 
backing up critical information system assets. Increasing the retention period may 
improve the chances of recovery in case of a successful ransomware attack (Thomas & 
Galligher, 2018). Users should carefully scrutinize email messages before opening, keep 
operating systems updated (Bergmann et al., 2018), and consider incorporating a strategy 
to keep important small business data backed up (Thomas & Galligher, 2018). The small 
business leaders of this study had adequate support structures, access to trusted sources of 
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information on cybersecurity, and were confident in their ability to address the evolving 
threat of ransomware. 
Implications for Social Change 
One positive implication for social change is providing research results that may 
help mitigate the existing threat of motivated offenders who commit cybercrimes, 
specifically ransomware. Some of the prerequisites of routine activity theory are satisfied 
when studying cybercrime and users on the Internet, as cybercriminals are prevalent on 
the Internet and Internet users fulfill the role of suitable targets (Bergmann et al., 2018). 
Individuals accountable for securing information systems similar to what is in use at a 
small business may use the research results to help identify effective strategies used to 
mitigate the specific threat of ransomware. 
Mitigating the threat of ransomware may benefit communities and other 
organizations. Communities and other organizations may benefit when small business 
leaders ensure continuity of operations and maintain customer expectations. Small 
business leaders might use the study results to implement strategies to address 
ransomware and prevent data loss, prevent delays, and mitigate damage arising from a 
successful ransomware attack. 
Small business leaders may use study results to increase awareness and improve 
the security culture of their local organization and beyond. Increasing awareness of 
strategies to effectively address ransomware may help promote security at a societal 
level. Society as a whole may benefit as small business leaders might reach beyond their 
local peer network and influence others who may be responsible for implementing 
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strategies to address ransomware, reduce uncertainty, and promote a healthy 
cybersecurity culture beyond the local communities they serve. 
Recommendations for Action 
The recommendations I am providing are based on the research findings and 
could possibly serve as a starting point for future publications targeted to small business 
leaders responsible for strategies to address ransomware in their organization. Based on 
the research findings, I would recommend installing adequate antivirus protection, 
keeping software updated, using caution when opening files, and incorporating a data 
backup strategy to safeguard important small business information system files. 
Additionally, small business leaders having a peer-network with access to technical 
expert contacts or who use paid customer support channels were more confident in their 
strategy to address ransomware. 
I plan to disseminate the results of this study publicly as a keynote speaker at a 
Nutanix .NEXT conference or as a Cisco Live! panelist. The general content and specific 
findings from this study may be a useful resource for future work and career endeavors. I 
will use the research findings to justify solicited advice I might give during client 
discussions, while professionally consulting, and through my chain of command. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
One limitation of the findings is ransomware is an evolving threat, and successful 
strategies for addressing ransomware may continue to change. Known best practices may 
need adjustment to counter the evolving threat of ransomware. Future researchers may 
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need to consider ransomware evolution and how threat vectors may change over time to 
gauge strategy effectiveness to address ransomware. 
Future researchers may consider expanding the sample size, studying a different 
population, or modifying the research design. The sample size for this study was 
sufficient to reach saturation; however, future researchers may include a larger sample to 
verify results. Future researchers may focus on a specific sector of small business that 
may be known as more of a target for ransomware attacks, such as the financial or health 
sector. A quantitative or mixed-method design might allow future researchers to add to 
the discussion by incorporating additional data points and broadening the scope of 
inquiry. Additionally, future researchers might choose to investigate the inverse of this 
study and evaluate successful ransomware infections to understand failure and recovery. 
Reflections 
I began my scholarly journey as a degree-seeking student in March of 2008. I 
started by taking online classes, and as an information technology expert, the online 
environment was a natural fit for my existing skillsets. The culmination of effort, 
dedication, and focus on achieving high academic goals and following in the footsteps of 
giants has been a gratifying experience. I am better prepared to take on the challenges of 
working in a competitive environment where I can use what I have learned to improve 
performance and discover new information. The doctor of business administration 
process has taught me how to investigate the world using new tools and techniques to 
create meaningful change, sustainability, and positively influence those around me. 
Ultimately, it is my goal to share information and be the change in the world I want to 
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see. Sharing knowledge and improving the local community is one way to improve the 
world around me. I will continue to set a positive example by pursuing excellence and 
leading by example through servant leadership. Achieving the high academic standards of 
a doctorate is a challenging and difficult journey, but so are the rewards for those with the 
perseverance, determination, and tenacity to undertake and complete the challenge. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this multiple case study contain effective strategies to address 
ransomware, revealed the multifaceted strategy of support structures, and contains 
evidence of the cybersecurity awareness required to effectively address the threat of 
ransomware from the perspective of a small business leader. Additionally, the findings 
contribute to the literature on effective strategies small business leaders use to address 
ransomware in the context of routine activity theory. The small business leaders 
interviewed during this study were aware of the importance of protecting their 
information systems and implemented formal and instinctive strategies. The small 
business leaders who were successfully addressing ransomware: (a) relied on antivirus 
and firewalls to protect their data and network, (b) kept their information systems 
updated, (c) scrutinized files before opening, (d) had a support structure for assistance in 
the event of an adverse event affecting their information systems, and (e) used their 
cybersecurity awareness of threats as a strategy to effectively address ransomware. 
Some of the small business leaders were unimpressed with free software 
purporting to protect their information systems and instead preferred to pay for antivirus 
protection from reputable vendors. The small business leaders were cognizant of the 
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threats posed by fraudulent emails and were cautious about opening suspicious email 
attachments. The small business leaders who lacked confidence in the ability of their 
existing information systems switched to newer systems as alternatives they perceived as 
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Appendix: Interview Protocol 
Participant Information: 
Date: __________________ 
Participant Identifier: ____________________________ 
Introduction: 
1. I will introduce myself to the participant and ensure I have a signed informed 
consent from the participant. 
2. I will begin the interview with: Thank you for participating in this interview to 
explore effective strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. I 
will audio record the interview for transcription purposes and take notes as the 
interview progresses. I will keep your identity and responses confidential, you can 
skip any of the interview questions, or stop the interview at any time. Do you 
have any questions for me before we start? 
3. I will begin the audio recording now. 
4. I will stay cognizant of any non-verbal cues, ask follow-up probing questions 
when appropriate, and conduct member checking during and post-interview. 
Interview Questions 
1. What strategies do you use to protect your information systems from 
ransomware? 
2. How did you assess the effectiveness of your strategies for protecting your 
information systems from ransomware? 
3. What were the key barriers to implementing the strategies for protecting your 
company from ransomware? 
4. How did you address the key barriers to implementing the strategies for 
improving your protection against ransomware? 
5. What other information could you add that might be applicable to the strategies 
that small business owners use to protect their information systems from 
ransomware? 
Conclusion: 
I will conclude the interview by thanking the participant for their participation and 
arrange for a convenient time for me to contact them to conduct a member 
checking interview. 
Member Checking: 
1. I will contact the participant by telephone and confirm if the participant agrees 
with the meanings I derived from the interview responses. 
2. I will repeat the process of member checking until we agree with the meanings I 
derive from their responses. 
